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UNION DECISIONS ON COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING GOALS: A PROPOSAL FOR
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION
Eileen Silverstein*t
As the statutory representative of workers in a bargaining
unit, a labor union has sole authority to represent their interests
in negotiations with management over the wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment.I Yet when conflicts of inter-
est arise within the bargaining unit, a union is not required to
furnish a forum for debate on the economic choices facing the
workers or to convey differences among the workers' views to
management during negotiations. "[S]ubject always to com-
plete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion,"2 the union may resolve internal disputes over collec-
tive bargaining provisions in any way it chooses. As a result,
bargaining unit members must either work under the union-
negotiated contract, refraining from direct discussion with man-
agement over employment coffditions, or quit their jobs.3 This
Article assesses the consequences of unions' virtually unre-
strained power to set bargaining priorities and to reconcile antag-
onisms among the workers they represent. It then evaluates the
function that economic interest groups within unions might serve
if workers were encouraged to form interest groups0 and these
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of California - Davis. A.B. 1968, University
of Nebraska; J.D. 1972, University of Chicago. - Ed.
t My appreciation to James B. Atleson, Julius G. Getman, and Bernard D. Meltzer
for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this Article. Special thanks to Robert
J. Rabin for many lively conversations and for his constant encouragement.
1. Labor organizations are also the exclusive representatives for bargaining unit
members in disputes with management over alleged breaches of contract. See Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976) [hereinafter cited as L.M.R.A.]
enacted in 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, as an amendment to the National Labor
Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 [hereinafter cited as N.L.R.A.], and the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R.L.A.]. For con-
venience, statutory references will be limited to the N.L.R.A. unless differences in the
R.L.A. are material to the discussion. Although some of the cases cited involve claims
under the R.L.A. instead of the N.L.R.A., the standard of review is the same. See notes
28 & 43 infra.
2. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
3. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975) (unionized employees who sought to bargain separately with their employer
were not protected by § 7 of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), and their employer
could discharge them).
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groups were recognized as legitimate mechanisms for meeting the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous workforce-'
I. THE RULES OF THE GAME
The legal framework in which unions operate is relatively
simple. Congress has granted workers the right to organize for
mutual aid and protection and to designate a bargaining repre-
sentative to deal with management on their behalf.5 The bargain-
ing representative is chosen by a majority of the workers in a
bargaining unit' and, once selected, becomes the exclusive repre-
sentative for all workers in the bargaining unit regardless of
whether any particular worker wanted the union, and, in the case
of new employees, whether the worker had any choice at all.
The exclusivity requirement hinges on two assumptions: (1)
a union can deal most effectively with employers if it speaks for
a united front of workers;7 and (2) similarly situated workers,
whatever their present differences, share common economic in-
terests over the long run that can be realized most effectively
through an association governed by majority choice. Although
4. Atherton's definition of a group can be used to describe an economic interest
group:
The potential membership of our union is to be thought of as divided into
several groups called AB, C, etc. Within any one group, the members share identi-
cal preference orderings over all possible values of (w,h,t,p,e,S,). Indeed this is just
what we mean, and all that we mean, by the word "group." A group's members
need not share other characteristics such as skill, seniority, age, sex, race, current
wage, or attitudes toward supervision, although as a practical matter they very well
might. All that they must have in common to constitute a "group" is their prefer-
ence ordering over wages, etc. - and their common preference ordering must differ
from that of every other group.
. . .The real phenomenon which our partition into groups is meant to approximate
is the organization divided into several blocs. Members of such blocs are apt to have
aims which, while not perhaps identical, are nonetheless similar and markedly
distinct from the objectives of members of other blocs. By assuming homogeneity
of preferences within the groups of our model, we are putting aside the smaller
differences in order to concentrate on the larger ones.
W. ATHERTON, THEORY OF UNION BARGAINING GoALs 80-81 (1973) (emphasis in original).
5. N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
6. The N.L.R.A. provides for government-conducted elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(1976). The judiciary has endorsed selection of the bargaining representative through
voluntary recognition by the employer pursuant to a showing of majority authorization
by the union, see Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304 (1974),
or through a judicial or Board determination where employer conduct makes the holding
of a fair election impossible, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1967).
7. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Weyand, Majority
Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 556, 565-67 (1945).
8. For a historical discussion of the majority principle, see Schreiber, The Origin of
Interest Group Participation
the validity of these assumptions is debatable,9 the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts have uncritically
accepted them and have made decisions reflecting them. For ex-
ample, implicit in the assumption of common long-term goals is
the belief that the NLRB always designates satisfactory bargain-
ing units. Although the Board considers a number of factors in
determining an -appropriate unit, it has looked principally to
whether members of the proposed unit have a "community of
interest" - whether they share common economic goals. Today,
however, a community of interest reflects shared interests over
time far less than it reflects management's description of present
job conditions or union's delineation of the unit it can organize
successfully.,"
Once a union becomes the exclusive representative, the labor
laws say little about its obligations to those it represents. Under
the 1935 Wagner Act, only employers could commit unfair labor
practices." When Congress finally prohibited unfair labor prac-
tices by unions, it only imposed obligations to deal fairly with
employers and workers that mirrored employers' obligations to
deal fairly with unions and employees.'2 Neither employers nor
unions may interfere with worker self-organization, neither may
penalize workers because of their support for or refusal to support
a union, and each must bargain in good faith with the other.' 3
the Majority Rule and the Simultaneous Development of Institutions to :Protect the Mi-
nority: A Chapter in Early Amercan Law, 25 RuTGERS L. REv. 237 (1971). Cf. McConnell,
Historical Traits and Union Democracy, 81 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 603, 603 (1958) ("The
democratic tradition which unions have followed. . . is founded primarily, if not exclu-
sively, on the concept of majority rule.").
9. See Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Indi-
vidual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 897 (1975). See also
the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 73 (1975).
10. See Schatzki, supra note 9, at 897-98 nn.3-4.
11. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976); J. ATLEsON, R. RABIN, G. ScHATzIU, H.
SHERMAN, JR., & E. SILvERSTEIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 84-86 (1978).
13. Congress did amend the proviso to § 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976),
in a manner designed to strengthen the rights of workers against their employers. The
proviso originally read:
That any individual or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer.
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 453. The amendment added:
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That
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Just as the legislation does not regulate the terms and conditions
of employment that management may establish for nonunionized
employees, it does not obligate a union to reach a bargain that
maximizes the interests of its members. Congress probably im-
posed no greater duty of unions toward members than that of
employers toward employees because of some mystical faith in
the marketplace. Theoretically, competition among employers
will shape management's policies, and competition among unions
will force the representatives to be accountable to their workers. 4
Congress recognized that the marketplace theory may be
the bargaining representative has been given the opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136. This amendment appeared to strengthen the unionized
workers' right to pursue their individual claims against the employer; however, in Empor-
ium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975), the
Supreme Court implied that the proviso of § 9(a) does no more than shield an employer
from unfair labor practice charges if that employer meets with unionized employees over
a grievance. That interpretation has blunted whatever potential the amendment had. For
an excellent analysis of the legislative purpose in amending the proviso of § 9(a), see Lynd,
The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legisla-
tive History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975).
14. The majoritarian selection of an exclusive representative disposes of decertifica-
tion as a possible safeguard for dissident union minorities. See Wellington, Union Democ-
racy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J.
1327, 1337-38 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Union Democracy]. Cf. Jones, Disestab-
lishment of Labor Unions for Engaging in Racial Discrimination-A New Use for
an Old Remedy, 1972 Wis. L. Rav. 351, 355 (which proposes disestablishment for racially
discriminatory unions instead of decertification, which is ineffective). In addition, the
NLRB has held that a union may expel from membership a member who files a decertifi-
cation petition, because the member was attacking "the very existence of the union,"
Tawas Tube Prods. Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 48 (1965); but a union may not fine a member
who files a decertification petition, International Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. 208
(1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971). These cases arp discussed in Wellington,
Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022, 1026-28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Union Fines]. Wellington correctly concludes:
In view of the important public policies favoring union democracy, the N.L.R.B.
should prohibit any form of discipline of dissidents who seek to unseat an incum-
bent union by means that Congress has sanctioned. The threat such dissidents pose
to the union's ability to defend its certification is, at best, overstated. The greater
danger is that the dissidents' fear of expulsion will perpetuate representation that
is no longer responsive to the will of the membership.
Id. at 1027-28 (footnote omitted).
Elections for union officials offer dissident members no greater hope. In a study of
local unions in Ohio between 1962 and 1967, Applebaum and Blaine found that local
officers exchange positions but that turnover occurs within a single group. Applebaum &
Blaine, The "Iron Law" Revisited: Oligarchy in Trade Union Locals, 26 LAB. L.J. 597
(1975). See also J. SEIDMAN, DEMOCRACY IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT 3 (2d ed. 1969). This
finding parallels that of the classic studies finding minimal turnover in national and
international officers. See Barnett, The Dominance of the National Union in American
Labor Organization, 27 Q.J. EcoN. 455 (1913); Taft, Opposition to Union Officers in
Interest Group Participation
flawed when it enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' 5
which prohibits the use of certain irrelevant criteria, including
race, sex, and national origin, by unions or employers in making
employment decisions. Unions had not secured equitable employ-
ment conditions for all of the workers they represented, and the
failure was particularly conspicuous with women, blacks, and
certain ethnic groups. Although Congress may have envisioned
that labor organizations would reformulate any policies and prac-
tices that had limited the employment opportunities of persons
protected by Title VII, the Act does not authorize disenchanted
minority workers to band together to influence collective bargain-
ing goals (even for the limited purpose of eliminating employ-
ment discrimination)." Title VII may affect some collective bar-
gaining choices, but Congress reaffirmed the exclusivity principle
by leaving the protected classes out of union-management nego-
tiations, thus preserving unions' monopoly power to' pick and
choose among their members' competing interests.
The 1959 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin) I" stands unsteadily as the single exception to
the legislative hands-off policy. The Supreme Court has de-
scribed it as a "code of fairness to assure democratic conduct of
union affairs."'" The Act includes a catalogue of due process
rights mandating regularity in the political and administrative
processes of unions: hearings for disciplinary action against union
members," limitations on the length of trusteeships, 0 regulations
on reporting payments to and from officers and employees of
Elections, 58 Q.J. ECON. 246 (1944). See also Tenure of Union Officers, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Feb. 1971, at 62; J. STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH,
POLIcY 31-32 (1973). Whether at the local level where grievance resolution is significant
or at the national or international level where bargaining choices matter most, these
studies suggest that economic interests held by a minority of workers may not be repre-
sented over time.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976). See also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976), amended by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1978, Pub. L. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189.
16. It would perhaps have been anomalous if Congress had developed a structure that
recognized these groups as separate from their unions, since each group's membership
would be based on suspect, employment-irrelevant characteristics. On the other hand, the
employment conditions associated with being black or being female do constitute easily
identifiable and relevant interests, and the ability of groups of blacks and women suitably
to represent those interests may logically follow from such conditions.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
18. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1976).
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labor organizations,"1 and requirements for timely elections of
union officers. 22 However, the affirmative obligations to give
members an equal voice in elections and to respect members' free
speech and assembly rights are subject to "reasonable rules and
regulations in [a labor] organization's constitution and by-
laws ' 23 and to "the organization's established and reasonable
rules . . . as to the responsibility of every member toward the
organization as an institution. ' 24 Thus, the provisions of each
union's constitution qualify key participatory safeguards of
Landrum-Griffin. If a union constitution calls for referenda on
policy decisions, or ratification of collective bargaining agree-
ments, or rank-and-file elections of union officials, then the equal
rights and free speech provisions of the Act guarantee all mem-
bers access to these processes. 25 But the Act does not require
unions to include members directly in policy making, either
through referenda or through contract ratification.
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR REQUIRING MORE FROM THE EXCLUSIVE
REPRESENTATIVE
Congressional acceptance of the ways unions reconcile the
competing interests of their members is understandable. Major-
ity rule is central to labor relations theory. 2 And except for the
thorny problems of racism, ageism, and sexism (problems that
are scarcely confined to the functions of unions), most unions
appear to meet the minimal demands of most of their constitu-
ents. However, because a union is a coalition of many diverse
economic interest groups, its responsibilities should not automat-
ically be defined by such a simplistic standard. Sufficient indica-
tors of dissatisfaction with union policies exist to merit a reeval-
uation of the role of economic interest groups in unions. This
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-440 (1976).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1976). 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1976) impose fiduciary obliga-
tions on union officials. See Leslie, Federal Courts and Union Fiduciaries, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1314 (1976).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976).
25. Overly restrictive judicial interpretations have blunted the effectiveness of the
equal rights and free speech provisions of Landrum-Griffin. See text at notes 51-55 infra.
26. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S.
50, 62 (1975). When using the term "majority rule," I am referring to decisions made by
an already unionized workforce. Nothing I say is intended to be applied to the requirement
that a majority of bargaining unit members must favor union representation for a union
to secure or retain representation rights.
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Section discusses the evidence of this dissatisfaction, which de-
rives from the complaints of workers represented by unions and
from scholarly discussions.2 1 It then evaluates the competing con-
sideration - majority rule.
A. Evidence of Dissatisfaction Among Unionized Workers
A major sign of the inadequacy of union policies comes from
the members themselves. Expressions of discontent by workers in
unions is especially credible because the workers involved are not
seeking to eliminate unions from the workplace. Rather, their
discontent reflects a desire to improve and strengthen unions, and
takes many forms, from assaults on union-negotiated contracts to
campaigns to influence union policies.
The most persuasive indicator of workers' dissatisfaction
with unions may be their persistence in suing to reform collective
bargaining agreements on the ground of union dereliction of duty
despite the almost certain failure of such suits. The Supreme
Court has made that failure likely by interpreting a union's duty
of fair representation to include a presumption favoring the union
leadership when members test a union's resolution of interest
group conflicts.2" In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,29 the Supreme
Court emphasized that a labor organization's negotiators enjoy a
"wide range of reasonableness" in exercising their "discretion to
make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the
27. For a different approach to the same issue, see Schatzki, supra note 9, at 898-
918.
28. Courts once looked more favorably upon workers challenging the performance of
an exclusive representative. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the
Supreme Court acknowledged an implicit statutory limitation on an exclusive representa-
tive's capacity to compromise its members' interests. The Court determined that, in
collective bargaining, a union must "represent non-union or minority union members...
without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." 323 U.S. at 204.
Under this formulation, courts could have required unions to justify their acceptance of
challenged contract terms by demonstrating that the terms benefited the bargaining unit
as a whole and that the means chosen was the least destructive to worker expectations.
Instead, the Supreme Court later chose the deferential path drawn in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), and Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). See text at
notes 29-42 infra.
Although-Steele was a suit brought under the Railway Labor Act, later that term the
Court extended its holding - that the grant of exclusivity under the R.L.A. imposed a
duty of fair representation on the union - to exclusive bargaining representatives under
the broader National Labor Relations Act in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (duty exists even in
absence of certification as bargaining representative).
29. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the
interests of the parties represented.""0 In Huffman, the union
agreed to a contract emendation that benefited only one group of
World War II veteran-employees by granting them fictionalized
seniority. Although alternative formulae might have achieved the
parties' purpose of rewarding one class of veterans for military
service, the Court found that, in accepting provisions that disad-
vantaged other veteran-employees and all nonveteran-employees,
the workers' bargaining representative met its duty "to make an
honest effort to serve the interest of all of [its] members, without
hostility to any.""1
The Court extended the Huffman rationale to the grievance-
presentation phase of representation in Humphrey v. Moore,32
stating that a union does not breach its duty of fair representation
by taking a position adverse to one group of workers. In
Humphrey, the union represented two antagonistic factions of
employees in a seniority dispute resolved by a joint union-
management committee. The Court recognized the inherent con-
flict between employees represented by the same union, but in
the absence of "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or
dishonest conduct, '33 refused "to remove or gag" the union, since
that "would surely weaken the collective bargaining and griev-
ance processes." '34
As long as considerations of race and membership status are
not the basis for allowing contractual benefits, the Huffman-
Humphrey rationale effectively shields a union's collective bar-
gaining decisions from judicial review.35 Yet bargaining unit
30. 345 U.S. at 338, 337-38.
31. 345 U.S. at 337.
32. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
33. 375 U.S. at 348.
34. 375 U.S. at 350. But see Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 142-43,
143 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discusses various approaches to reviewing union decisions
adjusting seniority rights).
35. Prevailing doctrine states that § 301 of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), does
not establish an action for workers against unions in the absence of a contract dispute with
management. Only when workers allege that the union violated its duty of fair representa-
tion in connection with an employer's breach of contract can the courts assert jurisdiction.
The workers may then sue the union alone or the employer and union jointly. In either
circumstance, the disgruntled employee must prove both the employer's breach of con-
tract and the union's violation of the fair representation duty to establish joint or union
liability. Vaca v. Sipes; 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Since any challenge to a union's support of
one group of workers over another in forming bargaining goals does not implicate the
employer, the Vaca requirements probably make a § 301 suit unavailable. Workers can
1492 [Vol. 77:1485
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members continue to file duty-of-fair-representation suits, alleg-
ing that a union's performance is "arbitrary," rooted in
"hostility," or lacking in "good faith" and "honesty of purpose."363
For example, when a union negotiates adjustments in seniority
rights following changes in a bargaining unit's membership,
workers are not untoward to expect the union to have a souna
basis for favoring one group of employees over another. However,
as Keane v. Eastern Freightways, Inc.17 demonstrates, worker
expectations may be sorely disappointed. In Keane, the union's
Joint Area Committee determined that endtailing rather than
dovetailing" appropriately resolved a seniority dispute following
a "corporate takeover. The union representing the employees of
the surviving corporation successfully argued that the takeover
was an acquisition and not a merger. Not surprisingly, the em-
ployees who were endtailed were represented by a defunct union
and had not voted for the leaders of the remaining union. The
court in Keane stated:
The plaintiffs were newcomers to [Local] 560 from [Local] 478.
There can be no doubt that union politics were not wholly absent
from the decision made by 560 to support its older members
against the Associated workers. But mere partisan influence in the
decision-making process is not itself grounds for relief."
challenge a union decision by filing an unfair labor practice charge alleging violation of
§ 8(b)(1)(A) of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). See Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 12,
United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
36. Labeling the union's violation of its duty of fair representation is not the least of
plaintiffs' burdens. In Huffman and Humphrey, the major decisions dealing with union
resolution of internal conflicts, the Supreme Court did not use the word "arbitrary" to
describe unlawful union conduct. "Arbitrary" first Appeared in duty of fair representation
jurisprudence in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967), a case involving a union's refusal
to take a grievance to arbitration. In Vaca, the Supreme Court stated that a breach of
the duty "occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargain-
ing unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," citing Humphrey and Huffman.
These citations may justify including the term "arbitrary" in the catalogue of characteri-
zations for determining the legality of union conduct in collective bargaining. For a sum-
mary of the terms used by the Supreme Court to define the duty of fair representation,
see Aaron, The Duty of Fair Representation: An Overview, in TH. DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION 8, 18-21 (J.T. McKelvey ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION].
37. 92 L.R.R.M. 3092 (D.N.J. 1976).
38. When seniority lists are endtailed, one group of employees receives priority over
another group and no attempt is made to integrate the lists on the basis of a controlling
principle such as length of employment. Dovetailing requires the integration of previously
separate seniority lists on some basis - e.g., by length of service, by ratio, by rank. See
Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 IND. LAB. REL. REv. 361 (1955).
39. 92 L.R.R.M. at 3097.
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The NLRB appears to agree that "mere partisan influence"
is not the kind of arbitrary or hostile conduct Congress contem-
plated in imposing the duty of fair representation." In a 1977
memorandum, the General Counsel's office advised that the
NLRB would not question a union's choice among competing
interests unless that choice was wholly without objective justifi-
cation and was based exclusively upon political considerations.4'
However, since practically all partisan union decisions can be
rationalized at least in part by objective factors, the Board's stan-
dard provides no genuine check on union discretion. The union
need only reject the employees' version of the facts to "act
'responsible' and wear the face of fairness"42 while using its con-
trol over the collective bargaining process to reward its political
supporters.
40. The NLRB has heard complaints that a union has violated its duty of fair repre-
sentation, finding jurisdiction under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A) (1976), which makes it an unlawful employment practice for a labor organi-
zation "to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section
7." The Supreme Court has assumed, without holding, that the Board has authority to
remedy duty-of-fair-representation violations. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-83, 186
(1967).
41. Strick Corp. (UAW Local 644), 95 L.R.R.M. 1526 (Advice Memo 1977). The
memorandum purported to explain the decision in Barton Brands, Ltd., 213 N.L.R.B. 640
(1974), enforcement denied and remanded, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976). In Barton, the
Board found that a union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by resolving a seniority issue solely
to satisfy the interests of the numerical majority in the bargaining unit. The Board's
decision in Barton was simplified by the union's initial acceptance of a seniority provision
requiring dovetailing that only wavered after proposed layoffs threatened the union's
original, and numerically greater, constituency. The Board's retreat from Barton Brands
appears to be complete. See Steelworkers Local 7748 (Eaton Corp.), 246 N.L.R.B. No. 6,
102 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1979). Cf. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (politically motivated opposition to seniority dovetailing violated § 8(b)(1)(A));
Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961) (the discrimination
claim of members of a weaker union following transfers from a defunct railroad line is an
issue of fact and should go to trial).
42. Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 362, 393 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Individual Rights]. Summers has argued
elsewhere that a union's support for one employee group's position is fundamentally fair
so long as the union obeys the collective bargaining agreement; that is the mechanism by
which the union - and through it, the employees - agreed to conduct their affairs dur-
ing the term of the agreement. He reaches the same conclusion when the agreement
provides no express direction but an established past practice is evidence. Summers, The
Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair
Representation?, in THE Dty OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 36, at 60 [herein-
after cited as What Constitutes Fair Representation?]. Summers still maintains, how-
ever, that an individual worker is entitled to nondiscriminatory and consistent application
of the agreement's provisions, free from "personal hostility, political oppression, or racial
prejudice." Id. at 82.
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The point is made brutally clear in Deboles v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.43 The International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM) represented all of TWA's aircraft
maintenance employees across the country, including those at the
Kennedy Space Center, where TWA had a contract with NASA.
Under the 1964 natibnal IAM-TWA contract, employees accrued
seniority in their job classifications based on length of time in
that classification, regardless of the TWA location at which they
worked. TWA used this national seniority ranking to permit em-
ployees to bid into other jobs within a classification and to bump
less senior employees during layoffs. But those IAM-represented
employees who worked at the Space Center were not included in
the national seniority system until 1970, and even then were not
given retroactive seniority for time in their classification at the
Space Center before 1970. Thus, a TWA employee at the Space
Center had considerably less job security than any other TWA
employee. Citing the testimony of TWA negotiators and petitions
from workers who opposed equalizing seniority, the Space Center
employees charged that IAM negotiated the separate seniority
provisions "to protect its own members elsewhere in the system
from the risk of being bumped from their positions in the event
of termination of TWA's contract with NASA at the Space Cen-
ter."44 The court of appeals, however, upheld the trial court's
finding that TWA's interest in a stable workforce at the Space
Center was a "relevant consideration" justifying union accept-
ance of the restrictive seniority system.
In light of the facts in Deboles, the appellate court's reliance
upon that consideration seems misplaced. The so-called relevant
consideration appears to have been of minimal relevance to both
managemerit and union; the court acknowledged that IAM offi-
cials withdrew one proposal that would have given retroactive
seniority to Space Center employees, in response not to TWA's
43. 552 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). Throughout Deboles,
the court discusses similar cases. See also Duggan v. IAM, 510 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1975).
In Duggan, the unions negotiated an industry-wide contract that cost the plaintiff flight
engineers their jobs. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the Supreme Court's use of the term
"arbitrary" in setting the standard for duty-of-fair-representation violations broadened
the scope of the union's duty; nevertheless, the court assumed that the union did not
breach the duty of fair representation, even though some flight engineers terminated
under the agreement received substantial severence pay while others did not. See also
Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938) (union justified
in destroying the seniority rights of women to keep men employed).
44. 552 F.2d at 1010.
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insistence on the need for a stable workforce but rather to pres-
sure from LAM's members elsewhere. Workforce stability was but
a smokescreen to obscure IAM's concessions to non-Space Center
employees. Moreover, to gain ratification IAM officials made
admittedly false statements to Space Center employees, saying
that IAM had done "everything in its power to obtain retroactive
system seniority, but that TWA had attached unacceptable con-
ditions." '45 Yet the court found no breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. The court also declined to address the argument that
the goal of a stable workforce could have been achieved by re-
stricting transfer rights into and out of the Space Center facility,
instead of absolutely denying Space Center employees the oppor-
tunity to accrue seniority in the national ranking system. IAM's
ploy in Deboles was not unique. Unions can easily justify partisan
decisions by alleging employer intransigence, and courts accept
these arguments uncritically, under the impression that the duty
of fair representation does not require judges to examine a
union's search for alternative solutions less disadvantageous to
dissident groups in the bargaining unit."
Union members who assert a right to influence decisions on
union policy are no more likely to succeed than members who
challenge a bargain their union has made on their behalf. It is
well settled that unions are not required to give rank-and-file
members the opportunity to ratify collective bargaining agree-
ments.47 Where union constitutions provide for worker approval,
however, one might expect that members could cast a meaningful
vote on the terms and conditions under which they will work. But,
as Davey v. Fitzsimmons4" illustrates, unions are allowed much
leeway in designing their ratification procedures. In Davey, mem-
bers of various Teamsters locals sought to enjoin the national
Teamsters leadership from enforcing its ratification plan for a
national agree ment that included thirty-two supplemental area
contracts. Under the leadership plan, the entire package was to
be submitted to the national membership for majority ratifica-
tion. The plaintiffs argued that the union constitutional provision
45. 552 F.2d at 1013.
46. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See also Strick Corp.
(UAW Local 644), 95 L.R.R.M. 1526 (Advice Memo 1977).
47. Confederated Indep. Unions Local 1 v. Rockwell-Standard Co., 465 F.2d 1137,
1140 (3d Cir. 1972); Davis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 97 L.R.R.M. 3141, 3143 (W.D.
Va. 1977) (ratification by union members not required as long as union constitution
permits union to act without members' authorization or consent).
48. 413 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1976).
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for submission "to the membership covered by the contract" re-
quired that all workers vote on the national contract but that only
those workers affected by an area supplemental agreement vote
on the provisions for their area. Such a construction would have
maximized the value of ratification by requiring every enforcea-
ble provision to be approved by a majority of those whose lives it
affected. Judge Bryant, in dismissing an allegation that the single
national vote violated the Landrum-Griffin's guarantee of equal
voting rights," interpreted the constitutional provision to allow
submission of all employment terms in a single referendum to the
entire membership. The court felt that binding locals to area
supplements through a national vote was a permissible tradeoff
for the overall benefits of national negotiations."
Workers attempting to influence union decisions before
collective bargaining begins may also find that unions can limit
effective opposition to leadership recommendations. In Newman
v. Local 1101, Communications Workers of America (CWA), 5' a
job steward, who was a member of a group within his local called
"United Action," fought the union leadership's tactics and pro-
grams for upcoming contract negotiations. Reversing the grant of
a preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit held that the union
leaders could remove the dissident without violating the free
speech and antidisciplinary provisions of Landrum-Griffin.52 Al-
though it acknowledged that a union member could not be ex-
pelled in reprisal for exercising free speech rights, the court never-
theless upheld the union's action:
[O]nce he accepts a union position obligating him fairly to ex-
plain or carry out the union's policies or programs, he may not
engage in conduct inconsistent with these duties without risking
removal as an official or employee (but not as a union member)
on the ground that his conduct precludes his effective representa-
49. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
50. Judge Bryant stated:
While package ratification may not represent the most desirable mode of ratifica-
tion from the point of view of all union members [and] [wihile plaintiffs object
to being bound by the area supplement applicable to them merely because a major-
ity of members nationally approve of the package as a whole, this is simply a result
of the tradeoff that the union, in conformity with its own rules and procedures, has
determined to be an acceptable price to be paid in return for the overall benefits of
the national negotiating process. And the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that
the union may not make such a choice.
413 F. Supp. at 677.
51. 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), 529 (1976).
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tion of the union. Unless the management of a union, like that of
any other going enterprise, could command a reasonable degree of
loyalty and support from its representatives, it could not effec-
tively function very long.53
The court of appeals found no chilling of free speech rights
since "despite a prior decertification as a job steward and the
union leadership's prior refusal to certify him after election to
that office, Newman continued to exercise his free speech rights
as a union member, conducting vigorous campaigns for greater
democratization in opposition to [the local's] incumbent leader-
ship." 54
In the same way that union members expect that officers as
well as members will have the right to speak out about union
policies, they might expect the opportunity to communicate with
their coworkers about issues facing the union. But some union
leaderships - with judicial approval - have effectively limited
members' rights to address one another. In Murphy v. Local 18,
International Union of Operating Engineers,5" Local 18, which has
jurisdiction over districts in eighty-nine Ohio and Kentucky
counties, called district meetings to solicit members' views on
bargaining proposals, but a union official refused to let dissident
members address district meetings other than their own. The
dissidents believed that informative discussion of the contract
proposals would include presentations by supporters and oppo-
nents, regardless of the districts in which they worked. That be-
lief seemed reasonable, since the leadership could move from dis-
trict to district explaining its position. However, the dissident
members were disappointed to learn that, because the union con-
stitution and bylaws provided for separate district meetings, the
leadership's denial of access to other locals was not a violation of
section 101(a)(1) of Landrum-Griffin.
These examples of worker dissatisfaction with the exclusive
representative are not isolated. They exist throughout the repre-
sentation process from the election of union leadership to the
formulation of collective bargaining proposals and contract ratifi-
cation. And they are symptoms of a flaw in the framework of
union-member relations.
53. 570 F.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
54. 570 F.2d at 448. Before passage of Landrum-Griffin, Joel Seidman condemned the
power of union officials and those union constitutional provisions that could be used to
discipline members. See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 14, at 13-17, 40-41; compare id. at 60-70.
55. 99 L.R.R.M. 2074 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
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B. Evidence That Scholars Recognize a Need to Regulate
the Exclusive Representative
Soon after the consolidation of union power, scholarly com-
mentators expressed concern that unions might disregard or
suppress the interests of some members." During the last twenty
years, however, only limited discussion has appeared concerning
the problems of interest groups within unions. This Section
analyzes the most significant contributions that scholars have
made to the analysis of this important issue.
As early as 1958, Harry Wellington responded to proposals
for federal legislation to democratize unions 7 by suggesting that
Congress explicitly give the NLRB jurisdiction to review union
compliance with the duty of fair representation. Under his pro-
posal, the Board would apply a standard of employee-community
expectations when evaluating a'challenged union decision. He did
not elaborate this review standard beyond indicating that the
Board would consider the nature of the employees' claim, the
reasonableness of the employees' expectation, the relevant in-
dustrial practice, and other pertinent factors. According to Wel-
lington, the Board was the appropriate reviewing body because
it had the expertise in labor relations necessary for an informed
judgment - an expertise that cultivates sensitivity to employee-
community expectations. 9
When Wellington made his proposal, an assumption of
56. A representative sample would include: Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty
of Fair Representation, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Criti-
cal Job Interests: Union-Management Authority v. Employer Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L.
REV. 631 (1959); Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1435 (1963);
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VmL. L. Rav. 151 (1957); Dunau, Employee
Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 731
(1950); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM.
L. REv. 563 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14.
57. Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14, at 1357-61. Wellington particularly
opposed federal legislation regulating union admission, disciplinary, and election deci-
sions. He rejected such federal legislation as unnecessary and unwise, in light of Steele v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), see note 28 supra, and considerations of federal-
ism. His view did not prevail, and Congress enacted Landrum-Griffin. Compare Welling-
ton's evaluation of that Act, as enforced, in Union Fines, supra note 14.
58. When that article appeared, no case clearly held that the NLRB had jurisdiction
to hear duty-of-fair-representation claims. See note 40 supra.
59. Wellington did not say whether a distinction should be drawn between contract
administration and negotiation, but the tenor of the article suggests that, since the duty
of fair representation is applicable to both phases, his model for review would also apply
to both.
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NLRB expertise prevailed." Contemporary research has shown,
however, that Board evaluations of worker attitudes are often
intuitive at best.6' Moreover, even in 1958 it may have been too
much to expect an agency to determine employee and community
expectations existing at the time an issue was originally resolved.
The only relevant expectations would be those at the instant time
of the union decision, not during the period of NLRB review. Yet
the effects of a union decision that are known only by hindsight
would certainly color the measurable expectations of the affected
employees and community."2 And even if one ignores the corrosive
effects of time, one cannot ignore the costs of the detailed factual
investigations and hearings that review under such a standard
would necessitate. Simple polling could never suffice when the
credibility of each individual respondent would be such an impor-
tant factor in computing an aggregate "expectation."
Postdecision review can also threaten industrial stability by
unsettling the expectations of the union, the workers, and the
management about the completed agreement. Even if not
abused, it could interpose long delays between the signing of an
agreement and the day it takes full effect. These delays could
hamper the union's ability to bargain successfully with manage-
ment. Although management might be no less willing to enter
collective bargaining agreements, its fears that the settlement
could come undone might skew the bargain it is willing to strike."'
60. In a series of cases between 1957 and 1960, the Supreme Court repeatedly refused
to review the merits of arbitration award decisions, see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
61. See J. GE-riAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALrry (1976).
62. See NLRB v. Local 315, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976),
where the union's executive board and the court of appeals agreed that an election to
determine the members' seniority rights was invalid "'because a vote was taken after
the fact that an operation was being eliminated and that a fair vote could not be taken
at this time.'" 545 F.2d at 1175. The court held further, "[Tbo base its decision as to
whether the bumping principle should in general be applied to this Employer upon an
expression from the employees so limited in scope and focus constituted arbitrary Union
action without rational basis . . . ." 545 F.2d at 1176. It is suggested, however, that a
membership vote on policy would be acceptable if it were taken before the effect of a
particular management decision was known. 545 F.2d at 1176.
63. While the concern for stability does weigh against an increase in participation
rights for interest groups, I will argue that controlling the nature and frequency of postde-
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The Wellingt6n proposal poses two additional problems.
First, Board review of union decisions may be an empty gesture.
In light of the deference usually shown union actions toward
workers,6 the Board might translate the employee-community
expectation test into a copy of the lenient duty of fair representa-
tion. The broad rubber stamp would have been passed from the
courts 5 to the Board. Second, resort to the Board may offer the
aggrieved employeeg no significant savings of time or money over
court litigation. Even though workers discharged in a merger
would not need an attorney before the Board, they would still
need wages while they awaited a decision." Although the un-
happy workers might successfully force their union to arbitrate
with management by filing a charge before the NLRB, they would
still be represented by an indifferent - even hostile - agent.
Nonetheless, the Board would be hesitant to look behind the
arbitration to assess the adequacy of the union's representation, '
given the availability of courts and duty-of-fair-representation
suits to perform that task after the arbitrator renders a decision."5
Thus, Board review would only complicate the workers' challenge
to the actions of their exclusive representative.69
cision review will minimize instability and notify management of the likelihood of the final
agreement's approval. See Section I of this Article infra. The Wellington suggestion does
not offer any controls on the frequency of postdecision review.
64. See text at notes 29-50 supra.
65. Courts may also reduce employee expectations through their recurring emphasis
upon stable -collective bargaining and the need for industrial peace through bargaining.
Wellington, however, did not consider the effect of Board review on the bargaining rela-
tionship.
66. Additionally, the Collyer doctrine of Board prearbitral deferral would, in some
instances, foreclose de novo Board review. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837
(1971); National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). National Radio Co. was overruled
in 1977 because of a change in Board membership. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228
N.L.R.B. 808 (1977) (3-2 decision). While, at present, the Board probably will not defer
discharge disputes and other individual statutory rights cases under Collyer, there is no
guarantee that Collyer's philosophy will not once again be extended to cases of discharge
and § 7 rights under the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
67. As an initial matter, grievants seeking a Board hearing would need to be suffi-
ciently sophisticated to be aware that their unfair labor practice charge might cause a
union decision in favor of arbitration; they would then need evidence that the union
evidenced bad faith in initially refusing to take the case to arbitration.
68. Cf. Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447 (1977), overruling Bekins Moving &
Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 146-48 (1974) (where the dissenters argued that review of
a union's certification, requested by minority workers, should be made only after the
certification and the alleged violation of the duty of fair representation).
69. This consequence could be avoided if the Board's jurisdiction to determine the
merits of interest group disputes were not tied completely to its authority to hear and
remedy duty-of-fair-representation cases.
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George Schatzki unleashed perhaps the most scathing indict-
ment of the quality of union representation in a 1975 article ques-
tioning the continuing viability of the exclusivity principle 2' He
argued that exclusivity based on majority choice subjects individ-
ual workers to representatives they do not want." He contends
that a representative controlled by a simple majority may be
unresponsive to the needs of individual members and may pro-
mote grievances only selectively, thereby fostering both worker
apathy concerning union affairs and worker dissatisfaction with
employment conditions. Ultimately, this may cause wildcat
strikes.12 According to Schatzki, a system of union representation
that jettisons exclusivity and allows individualized representa-
tion is feasible:
The keystone of a model of collective bargaining which did not
allow majority rule to determine the bargaining agent would be the
principle that every employee could select his or her own represen-
tative, if any. No one would be represented by a labor organization
unless it was actually selected by that individual. Second, the
employer would be obligated to engage in good faith collective
bargaining with each of the collective bargaining agents authorized
by that employer's employees. Third, the unions could engage in
coalition or cartel bargaining, and the employer would be required
to bargain on that basis. 3
Schatzki's proposal suffers from two polar problems. One
difficulty, which he addresses but never quite dispels, is the possi-
ble return to individualized bargaining and the attendant crip-
pling of the worker's bargaining position. Schatzki questions the
70. Schatzki, supra note 9. Schatzki's primary concerns are that individual workers
have the opportunity to choose their own representative and control the handling of their
grievances.
71. Id. at 898.
72. Id. at 915-18.
73. Id. at 919 (footnote omitted). Schatzki acknowledges a number of objections to
his suggestions; he always responds with the caveat that his predictions are speculative,
id. at 920. His caveat makes it impossible to criticize his various defenses or to challenge
his conclusion:
On balance, it is not clear to me that the possible drawbacks of abandoning
the exclusive representation model for collective bargaining in our country would
outweigh the benefits which would result. The proposal would give individual work-
ers considerably more protection to vindicate their own interests. In the process, it
is possible - perhaps likely - that unions would be more democratic, collective
bargaining would at least deal with more of the employees' problems and desires,
unions would be more responsive to individuals' grievances . . . . Hopefully, this
Article has at least made the idea of nonexclusive collective bargaining something
reasonable and worthy of further exploration.
Id. at 938.
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likelihood of such an occurrence, but he concedes the possibility.7'
If Schatzki is right, and labor would not in fact be weakened, a
competing concern becomes troublesome. If labor retains its bar-
gaining strength under multiple representation, the real burden
of nonexclusive representation must fall on the employer. 5 While
it may in some sense be just for unions that have failed to repre-
sent all their members adequately to bear the consequences of
competition for worker'affiliations and affections, no equity justi-
fies punishing the employer. Nonetheless, Schatzki's proposal
could force management to face multiple, perhaps irreconcilable,
demands from several unions representing workers doing the
same jobs, and to risk seriatim strikes each time a contract is
renewed. Why penalize employers for the historical shortcomings
of an exclusive representative?
While Wellington and Schatzki want to change the legal
framework in which unions operate, others have suggested less
drastic methods of encouraging pluralistic influences in union
decisions. One solution is for union leaders to accept political
opposition within their ranks. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman are the
foremost proponents of the argument that unions can effectively
serve their members by offering rival slates of candidates during
elections of union officers. 8 Ideally, Lipset would like all unions
to replicate the two-party political structure of the International
Typographical Union (ITU). But the conditions preserving the
ITU's two-party system77 appear, even to Lipset, to be unique to
74. Id. at 930-32. Schatzki feels that any loss of economic strength that labor might
suffer would be outweighed by increased responsiveness of the workers' representatives.
Id. at 932. While I share Schatzki's desire for responsive representation, I believe it can
be obtained without a substantial sacrifice of economic power. See Sections III and IV
infra.
75. Schatzki suggests that, for several reasons, collective bargaining with nonexclu-
sive representatives will not disadvantage employers: (1) an employer may be able to
settle first with a weak union, thereby establishing the wage rates and working conditions
for all employees, id. at 929, but see id. at 936; (2) an employer simply may not be any
worse off bargaining with many, rather than a single or a few unions, id. at 937; (3) since
employees will be more satisfied with more responsive representatives, reduced wildcat
activity will offset the cost of multiple negotiations, id. Because I am skeptical about the
advisability of completely abandoning exclusivity, I look to another solution to the prob-
lem of inadequate union representation. See Section III infra.
76. S. LnisET, M. TRow, & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOcACY: THE INSIDE POLITICS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (1956) [hereinafter cited as LIPsarJ. See J.
SEIDMAN, supra note 14, where the author argues that a "loyal opposition" of union mem-
bers is required to insure democracy within unions. Seidman would accept either a politi-
cal party or a faction as the "loyal opposition." Id. at 38.
77. Among the more significant conditions cited by Lipset are the homogeneous
population of the ITU, Ln'sEr, supra note 76, at 414-17, the lack of serious wage differen-
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that union.7" Perhaps for that reason, perhaps because the bene-
fits of autocracy are hard to relinquish, no other union leadership
has tried to institutionalize a loyal opposition. Either way, the
failure of union leaders to embrace a two-party system suggests
that leadership accountability to union members cannot be
achieved through voluntary imitations of the ITU political struc-
ture. Moreover, the two-party system may not be the best insur-
ance that union leaders will bargain effectively for the members.
For example, Lipset points out one deleterious effect of the ITU's
two-party system:"During all contract negotiations the opposi-
tion party carefully prepares the way for the next election. It puts
forward greater demands than the administration believes it can
gain from the employer. The opposition also criticizes the admin-
istration's handling of various grievance cases.""9 That approach
may enhance the standing of the opposition, but it may not im-
prove the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated
by the incumbents. 0
The arguments of Wellington, Schatzki, and Lipset demon-
strate that the modern scholarly debate about how unions operate
seeks not to undermine unions as an institution, but to expand
the rights of workers within their unions. More modest proposals
demonstrate the same positive concern. For instance, some sug-
gest requiring unions to submit all contract proposals and modifi-
cations to the membership for ratification before the union lead-
ers negotiate with management.8' However, like the more compli-
cated proposals, this option offers little solace to interest groups,
because it still pits small group interests against the general
membership. Furthermore, unless interest groups have the oppor-
tunity and the ability to express their views to the membership,
tials among the workers, id. at 162, the high prestige of the profession (which means that
by being a union official one does not significantly raise one's prestige above that of other
union members), id. at 243, and the union structure which limits competition between
printers in different cities and puts greater emphasis on officials for small units of printers,
id. at 411-13.
78. Id. at 462.
79. Id. at 332.
80. In addition, public bickering between the parties could allow management to
manipulate the bargaining process by rejecting the incumbent's demands on the ground
that an opposition victory at the polls will subject the employer to contradictory, and thus
very expensive, bargaining demands during the next contract negotiations.
81. See Simkin, Refusals to Ratify Contracts, in TRADE UNION GOVERNMENT AND
COLLECrIVE BARGAINING 107 (J. Seidman ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as TRADE UNION
GOVERNMENT]; Lahne, Union Constitutions and Collective Bargaining Procedures, id. at
167-97.
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ratification would be little more than an echo of the leadership's
position. 2 Even if a faction temporarily blocks ratification, its
interest may not gain recognition on the final agreement. 3 For
example, the 1978 United Mineworkers contract, which was fi-
nally approved by membership vote after two abortive attempts,
did not materially improve the position of older retirees, even
though those former workers enjoyed substantial rank and file
support. 4
Without a duty to negotiate with the dissenting members,
nonratification may not prompt the union leadership to respond
to interest group concerns at all. In a seminar on union govern-
ment, a number of well-known scholars, mediators, and practi-
tioners commented on the effects of nonratification:
A: The rejection of a tentative agreement recommended by a
union official is a rejection of the union officer as a political
leader, and as a result he may. . . come to the next meeting
and suggest that the company not increase its offer [so that
his image will not suffer].
B: I have had responsible union leaders, after the rank and file
have turned down a tentative agreement, tell me that we
cannot improve the offer, if we expect them to exercise lead-
ership in the future.
C: The union professional. . . met privately with the manage-
ment person and worked out the entire deal, but was afraid
the membership would reject it. So the two professionals
called in [a] mediator privately and told him of the problem
and of the deal they had worked out. They went through the
play-acting of negotiations, reached an impasse, called in the
mediator officially, and had him come up with the deal which
the two principals had worked out privately in advance. [The
82. The effective ratification requirement would have to provide dissidents with ac-
cess to the membership prior to the ratification vote. Similarly, a ratification provision
would need to guarantee a reasonable time period between announcement of the proposed
agreement and the ratification vote to allow dissidents the opportunity to campaign. The
UMW constitution, for example, requires a ten-day discussion period.
83. One might argue that, in addition to providing for member ratification of bargain-
ing agreements, the law should further protect economic interest groups by requiring
unions to subject all decisions and procedures to the approval of the majority of members.
Such a requirement would insure that the leadership has satisfied a majority, no matter
what the issue. Of course, the satisfied majority would vary in membership each time a
decision was made, depending on the issue involved. It is hard to see, however, how this
proposal improves the position of economic interest groups who constitute numerical
minorities. Also, Alice Cook has pointed out at least one example where, when a union
attempted to operate by majority rule to increase membership participation, the member-
ship's contributions were limited to nonpolicy decisions. A. COOK, UNION DEmoCRAcy:
PRACTICE AND IDEAL 39-77 (1963).
84. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
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union committee recommended it to the membership who
accepted it.]'
Moreover, once a majority of workers have rejected an entire
contract proposal, management has more influence upon future
union decisions. An employer may find that stalling in subse-
quent negotiations will destroy the union. Alternatively, manage-
ment may cooperate with the union leadership to reduce worker
support for a dissident faction. Employers typically prefer to work
with the existing union leadership, who recognize the value of
quick compromise and cooperation, rather than bargain with a
more demanding, unpredictable, insurgent leadership.
Other commentators have argued that outlawing the union
shop would make unions more responsive to their members be-
cause of the combined threats of decertification and refusal by
nonmembers to support union proposals for concerted action. "
Financial agreements requiring all bargaining unit members to
pay the equivalent of union dues and initiation fees, as provided
by the Taft-Hartley Act,8" could eliminate any "free rider" prob-
lem.
Nevertheless, serious drawbacks plague this proposal. First,
workers who pay dues but are not required to join the union may
85. Simkin, supra note 81, at 140, 141, 142. Compare the observations of E.A. Ross:
It is interesting to observe how the procedures for rank-and-file participation
in the wage bargain have increasingly become tools for the use of the leadership.
Originally intended to implement the final authority of the rank and file, they have
gradually undergone a subtle metamorphosis, until they have become a means of
conditioning the membership, communicating indirectly with the employer, and
guarding the flank against rival leadership. . .the procedures originally designed
to guarantee control by the rank and file have become devices for control of the rank
and file ....
The formal rationale of the union is to augment the economic welfare of its
members; but a more vital institutional objective - survival and growth of the
organization - will take precedence whenever it comes into conflict with the formal
purpose.
Ross, The Trade Union as a Wage-Fixing Institution, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 582-87 (1974)
(emphasis in original).
86. Theoretically, a union-shop clause requires that a worker join the union within a
stated time after commencing employment. In fact, the union-shop clause may only
condition continued employment on payment of dues and initiation fees. See § 8(b)(1)(A)
of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). Commentators agree, however, that few
workers in union shops are aware of their option to refrain from membership and merely
meet those financial obligations. E.g., Wellington, Union Fines, supra note 14, at 1051-
52.
87. Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373
U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
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not feel the same loyalty to their coworkers as do union members.
This loyalty is a socially important by-product of union member-
ship in part because it enables the union to use economic weapons
more effectively. Second, membership requirements promote
participation in union affairs - if one is not a union member
there is little incentive to change union policies.8 Insofar as un-
ions are the accepted vehicle for advancing the diverse interests
of workers, an active,89 broad-based membership is the only insur-
ance against permanent control by a few labor bureaucrats.
All of the scholarly criticism I have discussed so far has re-
lated to the union as a representative in contract negotiations.
Another side of union life has also fueled attacks on the adequacy
of union representation: a union's duty to represent an individual
employee who alleges that the employer has breached its con-
tract. Discussion of this issue is particularly noteworthy because
many of the more perceptive critics and judges have proposed
schemes that improve only the grievance aspect of union repre-
sentation 0 and have ignored the broader issues of individual and
interest group influence on the formation of general union policy.
But the distinction between contract negotiation and grievance
settlement may be illusory: Each grievance presents an opportun-
ity to refine or expand a contract term, albeit in a more limited
fashion than during contract negotiation, and settlements are
often tantamount to amendments to the collective bargaining
agreement.' Although the intensity of institutional and individ-
88. Employees who do not join a union "would not be entitled to attend union meet-
ings, vote upon ratification of agreements negotiated by the union, or have a voice in the
internal affairs of the union." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 737 (1963)
(comment of union vice president approved by NLRB).
89. Union members are notorious for failing to attend union meetings, but researchers
have found that turnout is significantly improved when vital economic decisions are on
the agenda. See TRADE UNION GovERNMENT, supra note 81, at 20-22; A. COOK, supra note
83, at 210-11.
90. See THE DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 36, in which eight contributors
discuss the duty of fair representation as if the only significant concerns were the individ-
ual grievant's access to representation for grievance and arbitration and the union's dili-
gence before and during arbitration hearings. See also Clark, The Duty of Fair Representa-
tion: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TExAs L. Rnv. 1119 (1973); Feller, A General Theory of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. Rnv. 663 (1973). Cf. Leffler, Piercing
the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance
Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35, arguing that there is a significant difference between the
contract-negotiation and administration obligations, but accepting uncritically the sim-
plistic proposition that the workers' interest in grievance handling is greater, and more
deserving of protection, than their concerns about the ongoing economic terms which
govern the workplace.
91. See Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and Func-
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ual interests may vary between negotiation and implementation,
it does not ineluctably follow that representation of group inter-
ests and individual interests may be assigned discretely to the
contract negotiation and contract administration functions of a
union.
A good example of the problems with proposals that see un-
ions through the narrow lens of grievance resolution may be found
in Clyde Summers's suggestion that federal law accommodate the
postnegotiation needs of individual employees through "direct
recognition of the individual's right under the contract."'"2 His
suggestion grants each employee three rights: the right to invoke
contractual grie 7ance-arbitration machinery if the union refuses
to do so, the right to participate in the arbitration hearing on an
equal footing with the union and management,93 and the right not
to be bound by a grievance settlement without consent.9 4 Where
an individual worker protests a union decision not to pursue a
grievance or not to seek arbitration, or questions the union's abil-
ity to present the best case, the Summers model is a good one.
The grievance-arbitration machinery would not be flooded by
frivolous disputes, because employees must initiate and fund
their individual claims. If an employee refuses to accept a union-
approved settlement, the refusal would only trigger an additional
discussion, higher level grievance negotiations, or perhaps arbi-
tration. Since the employee bears all costs, except where the
tions of Industrial Disobedience, 34 (O)t ST. L.J. 750, 802-04 (1973). On the distinction
between a union's duties when negotiating a collective bargaining agreement as compared
to administering one, see Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers of the Intl.
Longshoremen's Union, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974). The Railway Labor Act acknowledges
these two stages. The R.L.A. provides for resolution of major collective bargaining dis-
putes through federal district court injunctions and through voluntary arbitration before
the National Mediation Board, 45 U.S.C. § 155 First (b) (1976). Minor disputes, those
involving the meaning or application of a particular contract provision to a specific situa-
tion, are resolved by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which has primary juris-
diction. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976).
92. Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 410 n.188.
93. An individual member or group of members may enforce this right by initiating
arbitration or by intervening in arbitration between the employer and the union to protect
interests directly affected by the outcome.
94. Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 398-410. To a certain extent,
Summers's insistence on employees' rights to control their own grievances is but another
form of Wellington's concern for employee-community expectations. The right to reject
or accept settlement of a grievance is tied to the expectations the worker derives from
the collective bargaining agreement, the folklore of the workplace, and perhaps most
importantly, the support of coworkers and the union. Conversely, the resolution of a
particular grievance affects other workers' expectations by interpreting a shared contract.
See notes 57-68 supra and accompanying text.
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worker prevails and the union refused to seek arbitration solely
because of doubts about the outcome," employees will not seek
arbitration casually. When the union seeks arbitration, interven-
tion by an individual whose interests are directly affected should
not require many additional evidentiary presentations. In gen-
eral, the costs of the Summers approach to settling the grievances
of individual workers are minimal.
Unfortunately, Summers mistakenly assumed that his pro-
posal, with minor modifications, could be generalized to permit
employee groups with a common interest distinct from the
union's to participate in grievance settlements. 6 Under such a
plan, a rival union could advance its own dreams of a takeover
by offering financial support to grieving dissidents sympathetic
to its goals. If the union leadership panicked and began to back
every arguable grievance, management would lose its traditional
reliance on union judgment to screen spurious complaints. Fur-
thermore, the proposal might backfire. An arbitrator facing hon-
est grievance disputes between a minority interest group, the
union leadership, and the employer might accord the union inter-
pretation inordinate weight simply because it represented a sort
of middle ground.97 Even more appalling is the possibility that an
arbitrator might choose to maximize personal prospects for future
employment by agreeing to the interpretation of the two powerful
groups, casting aside the seemingly less significant view of the
interest group.9
The most ambitious proposal for considering substantive
interests during grievance settlements expands judicial review
of how unions settle employee grievances.99 Andrew Levy argues
95. Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 403.
96. See Summers, What Constitutes Fair Representation?, supra note 42, at 60-83;
Summers, Individual Rights, supra note 42, at 407 n.182.
97. A difficult problem could arise using the Summers approach. If an arbitrator's
award on a seniority issue is favorable to the position taken by a dissident employee group,
what happens when the group files an unfair labor practice charge, alleging a violation of
the duty of fair representation against the union, and seeks recovery of the costs of the
arbitration? Cf. NLRB v. Local 396, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (court upheld Board discretion to award legal fees to workers
in a successful suit to force the union to pursue their grievances in arbitration).
98. This outcome would be even more attractive to the arbitrator if the union and
the employer agree on the proper interpretation, as frequently occurs when dissidents are
denied access to arbitration by their union. See Schatzki, supra note 9, at 908 n.28.
Summers appears to endorse a union's actions so long as the union's position is based on
the contract and the union acts consistently, regardless of the merits of the grievance in
question. See Summers, What Constitutes Fair Representation?, supra note 42, at 72-75.
99. Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Limitation on Union Control of
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that, because plaintiffs find it too difficult to prove bad faith
and discriminatory motive in duty-of-fair-representation cases,
the courts should subject union settlements to one of two new
standards of representation. Under the first standard, courts
would evaluate a settlement as they would evaluate an arbitral
decision: if the union's decision failed to draw its essence from the
language of the collective agreement, the court would order arbi-
triation. Under the second, more complex standard, courts would
think like arbitrators: whether or not a settlement is arguably
justified by the contract's language, if a court thinks that an
arbitrator would deem it unacceptable, then the court would re-
quire it to be arbitrated. °0  Levy favors the latter approach, al-
though he admits that the courts might have difficulty making
anticipatory determinations of matters traditionally reserved for
the arbitrator.101
The desire for neutral, third-party review of settlements un-
satisfactory to the grievant is understandable, but the difficulties
with Levy's proposal suggest the reasons why it has not been
adopted. It is far more cumbersome than Summers's elegant and
self-executing scheme for giving employees control over their
grievances. Moreover, the Levy plan requires the federal courts
to screen all claims - whether frivolous or meritorious, whether
from individual grievants or from a group. The added burden for
court dockets is difficult to justify, particularly since the federal
judiciary believes the NLRB and arbitrators more able to evalu-
ate workplace disputes.'2
Further, any time a judge ordered arbitration pursuant to the
Levy plan, the arbitrator would be forced into an insufferable
position. How may an arbitrator pretend to be impartial, knowing
that a judge had, notwithstanding the opinions of the union and
management, found a grievant's complaint legitimate? The effort
would be particularly painful for an arbitrator who was familiar
with the industry, the tenor of disputes, and the general complex-
ion of settlements. Even where an arbitrator was asked only to
mediate, the mediation dialogue might be hamstrung by the arbi-
Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1970).
100. Id. at 1056-59.
101. Id. at 1058-59.
102. See cases cited in note 60 supra. Levy believes that since courts developed the
duty of fair representation, they should function as a prearbitrator. However, the courts
have derived the duty from statutory interpretation. The judicial interpretations, like the
statutes themselves, then serve as guides for administrative and arbitral bodies.
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trator's knowledge that a federal court had already defined the
contours of a reasonable settlement."3 Unlike arbitrators under
the Summers plan, who might know that a settlement agreeable
to both union and management had reached arbitration at the
insistence of a grievant, Levy's arbitrators would know that the
arbitration was forced by a higher authority."'
Finally, I question Levy's suggestion that grievance settle-
ments may be consistent with a collective bargaining agreement
but unacceptable to an arbitrator. Levy does not cite any areas
of labor law in which judicial evaluations of a contract claim
differ from arbitral evaluations. And such examples may be diffi-
cult to find given the differences in contract language and the
relative paucity of judicial and arbitral decisions dealing with
similar work issues. In one obvious area where such comparison
might be made - adjustment of seniority rights - cursory re-
search reveals that judicial acceptance of union leadership deter-
minations is mirrored in arbitrators' resolutions of such dis-
putes.'05
This discussion of worker discontent and scholarly concern
only pricks the surface of contemporary worries over worker rights
within unions. Of course, mere dissatisfaction with unions does
not indict the labor movement. Workers and their unions must
work together or face employer autocracy. Nevertheless, we
should see dissatisfaction as a signal that, within the broad
framework of union representation, the law might find better
ways to accommodate the desires of all union members.
103. Cf. Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983
(1976): "When one's own representative who has been willing to assume that status pro-
claims a lack of merit [to the grievant's claim] it is indeed likely to be a coup de grace
to the claim."
104. A similar criticism may apply to an arbitrator's award made after judicial
screening of the settlement proposed by the employer and the union. Knowing that a
federal judge has approved a particular resolution in advance, an arbitrator might avoid
the very award that seems mandated by the contract. On the other hand, an arbitrator
issuing such an award - as compared to mediating a dispute - may feel that as long as
a court has predicted that a certain resolution is acceptable there is no reason to pay any
attention to the court's feeling that the resolution is unreasonable. This latter instance
would yield a curious situation in which an arbitrator determines that an award draws
its essence from the contract and, on postarbitral review of that award, a federal court is
bound to agree. Thus, there is no value in influencing the process prior to arbitration.
105. I am not aware of any studies comparing judicial and arbitral evaluations of
union resolution of competing economic interests involving similar work issues and coii-
tract language.
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C. Majority Rule as a Value in the Workplace
The contours of any accommodation must, however, take
into account a pivotal concept in labor law - union decisions by
majority rule. 10 Generally, Congress and the courts have pro-
ceeded on the utilitarian assumption that majority rule is the
system most likely to maximize overall worker welfare."'l The
underlying assumption is that all individual workers should
weigh equally in the social balance. This application of the Ben-
thamite justification for liberal democracy is appealing in part
because it is familiar in American political life.'"8
But majority rule, like most simple principles, suffers from
imperfections if applied absolutely. It ignores intensities of indi-
vidual worker preferences, and it is precisely the intensity of these
preferences which may vary greatly in intensity, as we have
seen. 09 For instance, workers with preschool children may have
a strong interest in securing day-care facilities as a benefit pro-
vision during contract negotiations. Without such facilities, they
may be compelled to leave work to care for their children. On
the other hand, the majority of workers may not have small
children and thus may not derive any benefit at all from a day-
care center. If the majority votes its self-interest, it will always
defeat the day-care center, even though it may gain only a few
cents per hour in higher wages by doing so. The intensity of the
minority's preference and the mildness of the majority's prefer-
ence are not reflected under a simple one person, one vote system.
The theoretical objections are exaggerated in the union con-
text, where members' participatory rights appear more formal
than effective. Workers rarely have the right to participate in
106. For a historical discussion of the majority principle, see Schreiber, supra note
8. But see McConnell, supra note 8.
107. Justice Marshall best expressed this assumption:
Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining. . . is the principle of
majority rule . . . . In establishing a regime of majority rule, Congress sought to
secure to all members of the unit the benefits of their collective strength and
bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some individuals
or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority.
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967).
108. For a discussion of why majority rule is peculiar to American labor laws, see
Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARv. L. Rv.
1394, 1426-27 (1971).
109. See text at notes 27-50 supra.
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decisions to proceed with or settle grievances they have filed,""
or even to influence union conduct in arbitration hearings."' In-
creasingly, national staffs of union leaders negotiate nationwide
collective bargaining agreements that do not benefit from any
membership discussion."' Furthermore, workers generally as-
sume that the union leadership would retaliate against any at-
tempts to participate in the manner contemplated by the
Landrum-Griffin Act."' The law may not be responsible for
worker apathy,"4 but at least it should give nonapathetic workers
the right to participate in union decisions and effectively protect
them from retaliatior when they do participate." 5
Realizing that the outweighed interests of the majority do
not always maximize worker welfare, modem collective bargain-
ing embraces several exceptions to the theory that majority rule
is a prerequisite to effective union representation. These excep-
110. Participatory opportunities for affected workers may be lacking when Title VII
processes are used as well. See Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978); Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d
832 (9th Cir. 1976); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
affd. sub nom. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
837 (1978).
111. Cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (because a worker relies
so heavily on union representation during arbitration, the arbitration decision does not
bind the worker if the union breaches its duty of fair representation to that worker). But
see, e.g., NLRB v. Local 396, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
112. See, e.g., Davey v. Fitzsimmons, 413 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1976), discussed in
text at notes 48-50 supra.
113. The fear of retaliation is not irrational. Wellington noted in 1958 that unions
may have good reason to discriminate against dissenters who exercise participatory rights,
since those employees represent a threat to the union's political power. Wellington, Union
Democracy, supra note 14, at 1334. See also J. SEnMAN, supra note 14, at 28. As Welling-
ton predicted, the Landrum-Griff'm Act has not diminished this potential. See Leslie,
supra note 22, at 1315. For a distressing example of this point, see Newman v. CWA, 97
L.R.R.M. 2606 (2d Cir. 1978), discussed in text at note 51 supra.
114. See Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 Am.
ECON. REv. 44, 48, 52 (1958). See generally Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14,
at 1330. For a generally positive evaluation of Landrum-Griffin's effect, see P. TAFr,
RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS AND THE GovENMENT (1975).
115. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, tit. VII, § 704(a),
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976)) (making it an unlawful employment practice
for an employer or labor organization to discriminate against any union member or other
employee who "has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter"). But see
Garret v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976),
holding that an employer did not violate § 704(a) in firing a black worker who peacefully
presented complaints of discrimination to the employer's manager rather than to her
supervisor.
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tions also cast doubt on the corollary notion that only through
majority rule can a union present the united front that is alleg-
edly necessary for effective negotiation with management. For
example, groups of employees sometimes circumvent the prefer-
ence of the majority by bargaining as isolated "work groups."
Often such negotiations convince a supervisor to grant noncon-
tractual privileges to increase productivity. Such factional bar-
gaining, which may also be camouflaged as grievance settlement,
"is rarely considered to derogate from union authority. Indeed,
the union is normally aware of tacit agreements reached, and
these agreements are not normally incorporated into the collec-
tive bargaining agreements.""'
Of course, one might say that because the union leadership
knows of, and tacitly approves, work-group negotiations, they
are not pure exceptions to majority rule. Yet such reasoning can-
not explain the continued presence of union-disapproved "wild-
cat activity" by bargaining-unit members, nor can it explain the
forced presence of minority representatives in contract negotia-
tions concerning employment discrimination. But neither
phenomenon has destroyed the unions.
Wildcat activity is clear evidence of intraunion dissension,
but the unions have retained their bargaining strength even with
a less than united front."7 Employers expect that their union
contracts assure uninterrupted production and that the union
will quell any worker dissatisfaction by enforcing its rules against
unauthorized activity."8 But when those employer expectations
are disappointed, the number and scope of collective bargaining
agreements does not appear to diminish."' There is no evidence
116. Atleson, supra note 91, at 792.
117. On the utility and rationality of wildcats, see Atleson, supra note 91, at 754-55.
Indeed, issues in wildcats may be of little interest to union leaders even though rank-and-
file workers take them seriously. In wildcat strikes, employees may be protesting joint
employer-union action, see, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975), or union acquiescence in employer decisions supported
by collective bargaining provisions, see Atleson, supra note 91, at 769.
118. Wildcat action occurs despite the employer's right to retaliate through dis-
charges; and despite contract provisions linking pension fund contributions to producti-
vity. Atleson has suggested that employees represented by weak unions are in a double
bind. They will not be well-protected in grievance processing and will be more easily sub-
jected to discharge should they engage in wildcat activity, Atleson, supra note 91, at 816.
119. The difficulties in negotiating a 1977 Mine Workers' contract do not diminish
this argument. The workers' difficulties were, in part, caused by the mine owners' previous
insistence on arbitrating every dispute rather than engaging in informal settlement at the
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that wildcat activity influences an employer's decision to accept
employee organization. This suggests that effective collective
bargaining does not always require a united front of workers.' 20
Divided worker representation' 21 in confrontati6ns over em-
ployment discrimination furnishes an even more telling exception
to the majority principle. Both employers and unions have per-
mitted representatives of protected minority groups to bargain
over new contract terms and to appear in arbitration hearings. 22
Such minority group representation has occasionally exposed in-
consistent labor positions on certain issues, but it has still allowed
satisfactory dispute resolution.'1 Admittedly, the threat of litiga-
tion may motivate labor and management to permit multi-
interest representation,' 24 but the parties' motives for acknowl-
site and by the UMW leadership's historic inability to control the rank and file. Even after
rank-and-file rejection of the bargaining council-recommended contract, mine owners
continued to negotiate. Thus, the owners must have 'Perceived that the benefits of a
nationwide agreement outweighed dissatisfaction based on the union leadership's inabil-
ity to control rank-and-file workers. For a discussion of these negotiations see Horvitz,
What's Happening in Collective Bargaining?, I.R.R.A., PROcEEDINGS OF THE 1978 ANNuAL
ME=TiNG 453 (1978).
120. It could, of course, be argued that employers tolerate wildcat activity only to the
extent that there is no significant business loss or that unions are liable for damages in
connection with employer business loss. The extent of union liability merely defines the
boundaries of employer-accepted nonmajority conduct; it does not undermine the conclu-
sion that nonmajority activity can be consistent with collective bargaining. Cf. Atleson,
supra note 91, at 756-58 (wildcats are frequently not intended to alter institutional ar-
rangements, but are grounded in a desire to have work problems taken seriously). See also
Schatzki, supra note 10, at 917 (wildcatting helps weaker factions of employees air their
views).
121. The terms "divided worker representation" and "multi-interest representation"
mean that union spokespersons do not present the only worker position on disputed
issues, and that protected minority groups have separate representation.
122. Minority groups may be represented by selected counsel or by the EEOC, with
the EEOC always considering itself as also representing the public interest. Sometimes
more than one agency representative of minority groups may be present. See Local 189,
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
919 (1970).
123. Frequently, the employer and the union appear to be on one side of the table,
with the EEOC and minority groups on the other. In these circumstances, the interests
of the employer and union can never be identical, and all parties to the negotiation must
consider each opponent's demands from the perspective of self-interest.
124. The threat of litigation or a decree guarantees that the EEOC participant will
not be ignored and that the minority interests are represented at the bargaining table and
incorporated into the terms of the agreement. At times the attempt to avoid litigation
through conciliation may not work, as in Kaplan v. Local 659, State Employees, 7 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 894 (C.D. Cal. 1973), affd., 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975), where the
union had negotiated a conciliation decree with the Department of Justice concerning the
1516 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1485
edging diversity in the labor force do not detract from my present
point.'2 Effective bargaining and contract enforcement do not
depend completely upon a single union bargaining stance dic-
tated by majority choice, and they are not necessarily under-
mined by the participation of special interest groups in negotia-
tion and arbitration.z 6
employment of ethnic minorities. Plaintiff, a female, was not covered by the conciliation
agreement, but recovered anyway, on the district court's finding of a pattern of discrimi-
nation against women. Similarly, in EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
affd. in part and remanded in part, 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974), the court held that a
consent decree mandating remedial action in the areas of wages, goals, timetables, trans-
fers, and promotions, did not insulate the company from private litigation. In McAleer v.
AT&T, 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976), the court held that a consent decree requiring
preferential promotions was not a defense to an action for damages by a man who was
passed over for a promotion because of his gender. But see EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp.
1022, 1055 n.34 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977) (Title VII recognizes a
narrow but complete immunity for employer conduct undertaken in good faith reliance
on a written interpretation by the EEOC, and a consent decree qualifies as such.).
125. In fact, outside the context of employment discrimination, there is support for
the view that grievance arbitration proceedings will not be destroyed if the grievant, as
well as the union and management, participate in arbitration hearings. Multi-interest
arbitration has been ordered in duty-of-fair-representation cases, with the union responsi-
ble for paying the fees of the grievant's independent counsel. See NLRB v. Local 396, Intl.
Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); cf. Scott
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1974) (where union was held liable
for grievant's legal fees incurred at trial, not during arbitration, when grievant received
no relief from his employer and no help from the union despite his good-faith effort to
invoke the contract's grievance procedure). Even in the absence of a breach of the duty
of fair representation, the grievant has been made a party to arbitration proceedings when
the arbitrator has determined that his inclusion would be advantageous as a procedural
matter. See Hotel Employees v. Michelson's Food Servs., Inc., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.
1976). These courts appear to recognize" that postarbitration access to separate counsel
may come too late. But see Acuff v. United Papermakers, 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Laney v. Ford Motor Co., 95 L.R.R.M. 2002 (D. Minn.
1977) (employees alleging conspiracy may not have independent representation at con-
tractually required proceedings). Some unions may offer separate representation to the
grievants. See Crenshaw v. Allied Chem. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 594, 600 (E.D. Va. 1975).
But see Ensina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264, 1265 (5th Cir. 1971) (union could
offer to take case to arbitration on condition employee pays costs).
126. The presence of special interest groups at the bargaining table appears to be
gaining acceptance in grievance and arbitration hearings. Following the Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (an adverse arbitral
decision will not bar a timely Title VII claim but under certain conditions the arbitrator's
determination may be given "great weight" by the federal courts), some employers and
unions have negotiated collective bargaining procedures for handling employment dis-
crimination grievances. A contractual provision for separate grievance representation was
suggested by two of the Court's reasons for finding traditional arbitration proceedings
inadequate for final resolution of employment discrimination claims under Title VII.
First, the Court was concerned that in an arbitration hearing the grievant would not
benefit from the procedures authorized by Congress in Title VII. 415 U.S. at 55-59. A
contract provision which replicates the procedural regularity afforded complainants in
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Because majority rule has proved an imperfect means of in-
corporating multifarious worker interests into union decisions,
groups of disgruntled workers have turned to the courts to vindi-
cate their interests. In class action litigation, courts have recog-
nized that unions, although they theoretically represent the inter-
ests of all workers, may not be the proper class representative for
a bargaining unit. In Banks v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad,'27
a class of black workers sued their employer and union (the
Brotherhood), seeking to realign seniority rights. The court held
that white employees were indispensible parties to the action,
even though the black employees were alleging that the defen-
dant union supported the discriminatory seniority provisions to
the advantage of white employees. In the court's view, the union
had
an equal duty to represent those members comprising the class
which plaintiff represents as well as the white employees whose
interest would be realigned by any order granting relief to plaintiff.
It thus appears that the white employees' interest is not the same
as the Brotherhood's, and that the Brotherhood cannot fairly and
adequately represent the interest of the class."'
The situation is the same when a union has attempted to act
as a plaintiff class representative in challenging employment
practices. In Communications Workers of America v. New York
Telephone Co., '" the court refused to certify the Communication
Workers of America as representative of a class of all nonsupervi-
sory employees in a suit alleging discriminatory disability insur-
ance coverage. It reasoned that the union's interest was not coex-
federal court would necessarily include the right to separate representation. Second, the
Court recognized that in discrimination arbitrations the union's interest might differ from
that of the grievant, particularly where the issue is one of contract interpretation. 415 U.S.
at 58 n.19. The Gardner-Denver decision speaks to the issue of "deferral" particularly
when the arbitrator decides a factual issue. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. Multi-party representa-
tion, including independent counsel, for the grievants, would insure a complete airing of
the adverse positions. For examples of trilateral arbitration provisions, see Basic Vegeta-
bles Prod., Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. 620 (1975) (Gould, Arb.); Hammerman & Rogoff, The Union
Role in Title VII Enforcement, Cvrm RIGHTS DIG., Spring, 1975, at 22. For an evaluation
of the role of arbitration in private employment discirmination cases, see Meltzer, Labor
Arbitration and Discrimination: The Parties' Process and the Public's Purposes, 43 U.
Cm. L. Ray. 724 (1976).
127. 51 F.R.D. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
128. 51 F.R.D. at 305 (citing Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)). See
also Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 54, 61 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (distinguishing
Banks on the ground that the union in Sagers was not "vigorously" representing the white
employees' interests).
129. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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tensive with that of the class, because disability insurance is often
a subject of collective bargaining. 3"
The courts have also questioned whether unions seeking to
intervene on behalf of a class of workers can adequately represent
that class. In EEOC v. AT&T, 3' the Communications Workers
(CWA) sought to intervene as a party plaintiff after entry of a
nationwide consent decree to remedy sex discrimination. In re-
jecting the union's petition, the Third Circuit observed that the
CWA's
position as bargaining representative of all its members, both those
aggrieved and the equally large, if not larger, number of those who
are not adversely affected by, and indeed may to some degree
benefit from, the alleged unlawful employment practices, clearly
disqualifies it from acting in this action as a class representative
on behalf of the former group. 3
A union ruled by an unfettered majority cannot adequately
represent the interests of all groups within it. The class action
cases acknowledge this almost self-evident truth. And neither
pure majority rule nor the facade of a united front is necessary
130. Judge Tyler relied on two arguments. First, the judge cited Lynch v. Sperry
R nd Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 84 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in which the court held that even if
the potential conflict between the plaintiff union and individual plaintiffs were not so
serious, the union could not be the proper class representative of individuals. See also
International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 16 (N.D.W. Va. 1977). Second, Judge Tyler emphasized the "increasing number of
Title VII cases in which a class of employees is suing its union as well as the employers."
8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 513 n.1. But see International Woodworkers v. Georgia.Pacific
Corp., 568 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1977), in which the Eighth Circuit refused to hold as a matter
of law that a racially mixed union cannot be a class representative for black employees in
a Title VII suit challenging employment practices.
131. 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974).
132. 506 F.2d at 741. Judge Maris's comments were in response to the union's petition
to intervene under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1); the petition under rule 24(a)(2) was also
rejected, since CWA's desire to protect its ability as a bargaining agent seemed more akin
to the defendant's interest than to the plaintiffs'. But see EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167,
173 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978), in which the CWA attacked a consent
decree to which it was not a party and was held to have standing to sue as the representa-
tive of its members, even though the union might have acted "inconsistently with the best
interests of some of the persons whom they represent in the collective bargaining process."
The decision does not necessarily represent a retreat from the doctrine that unions cannot
adequately represent the interests of all members. CWA was intervening on behalf of
white males whose interests would be adversely affected by the consent decree and who
had not been represented when its terms were negotiated. At the same time, the original
plaintiffs in the massive negotiations leading to the consent decree had adequately repre-
sented those union members whose interests were not being protected by the union. For
an excellent discussion of the use of intervention in affirmative action litigation, see Jones,
Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative
Action, 14 HIAv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 31 (1979).
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for effective worker representation. As we have seen, the modern
labor world reflects its understanding of that reality by fashioning
de facto exceptions to the basic principle of majority control.
Thus, while that principle remains the cornerstone of union oper-
ations, room still remains to modify it whenever it bears too
harshly upon the welfare of particular groups of workers.
III. THE VETO PROPOSAL
If we accept that the evidence of dissatisfaction with unions
is substantial, and that majority rule need not absolutely govern
union decisions, then a reevaluation of the relationship between
economic interest groups and their exclusive representatives is in
order.'3 3 Inspired by Wellington's perception that employee ex-
pectations are a legitimate guide for reviewing union decisions' 34
and by Lipset's argument for organized internal opposition,! 3 I
propose that workers having common economic concerns within
unions be allowed to form interest groups, that unions be required
to deal in good faith with each interest group, 136 and that the
NLRB assert its jurisdiction to review disputed union decisions.' 37
Additionally, these interest groups should possess a limited right
to veto decisions of the majority, to assure that union leadership
will heed their concerns."18 The interest-group-veto system would
133. I have already explained the reasons for rejecting the Wellington, Lipset, and
Schatzki proposals. See notes 56-80 supra and accompanying text.
134. Wellington, Union Democracy, supra note 14. See note 59 supra and accompany-
ing text.
135. Ln'sEr, supra note 76.
136. Although the analogy is admittedly crude, it seems to me that, currently, eco-
nomic interest groups stand in somewhat the same relationship to their unions as labor
did to management in 1935, and that these groups require legal intervention to protect
their economic interests. Of course, the disputes between union leadership and their
constitutents, unlike the antagonism between labor and management which stems from
conflicting goals, is episodic and arises out of setting priorities for common goals.
137. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., Disston Div.-Danville Works v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970),
is not a barrier. See note 159 infra.
138. Interest groups composed of a majority of the membership would also possess
the veto power. Although a political majority has access to legal tools and may use the
political process to reprimand union leadership for unpopular decisions, practical experi-
ence suggests that these workers ought not to be foreclosed from using the veto since they
often feel themselves tyrannized by a minority, are unaware of available legal supports,
and are timorous of the political process. Moreover, a particularly intransigent minority
should not be able to force a contract provision on an unwilling majority group, both of
which are concerned about a particular issue. If the majority group were not able to
exercise a veto in the initial vote, it would be possible for the minority to ratify the special
provision and for a majority of all the voters to ratify the entire contract. Such a result
would inequitably subordinate the majority interest to that of the minority.
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encourage conflicting interest groups to resolve their differences
before the union leadership negotiates with management. It thus
would permit the union to maintain a united bargaining front,
while enhancing the likelihood that the membership would ratify
and adhere to the eventual agreement. 13
In Subsection A, I offer a brief overview of the veto proposal,
sketching its contours but deliberately leaving its texture impre-
cise. I hope that readers will be able to see quickly the manner
in which the different sides of the proposal reflect and reinforce
one another. In Subsection B, I share my conception of the pro-
posal's implementation by developing a detailed hypothetical
that illustrates many of the advantages that interest group vetoes
offer. Readers will thus have an opportunity to discuss the sys-
tem's inner workings, to criticize, and in searching for replies to
their criticisms, to improve the proposal. Finally, in Subsection
C, I discuss some of the veto proposal's special implications for
NLRB review.
A. An Overview of the Veto Proposal
1. Local Meetings and Interest Group Certification
Before negotiating with management, a national union
would have to discuss its intended strategy and contract demands
with the local membership. It would send representatives to
meetings of every union local, long before the beginning of union-
management negotiations. At those meetings, members could ask
questions and probe the leadership's position on any issue they
thought important. Workers sharing a common economic interest
who believed the union's position threatened that interest could
raise their objections."' If the meetings failed to satisfy them,
such workers could organize, choose leaders, and ask the national
leadership to certify them as an interest group.
A certification request need contain only three things:
1) The names of the group leaders,
2) The common economic interest defining the group, and
3) The contract negotiation issues on which the interest group
disagrees with the union leadership position.
139. Although one might assert that the union already has these incentives, the
sources for dissatisfaction discussed in Section H supra suggest that the incentives are,
at times, inadequate.
140. If a union comprises only a small, homogeneous group of workers, then the veto
proposal would probably be superfluous. However, for the same reason, the proposal would
probably pose no serious problem to union efficiency in such a circumstance.
[Vol. 77:14851520
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Within a fixed time of the application (perhaps two months), the
national union leadership would have to decide whether to certify
the interest group. If denied certification,' the interest groups
could petition the NLRB. If the union granted certification, the
interest group members would be assured a voice in the formula-
tion of contract demands.'
2. Intraunion Discussions and Searches for Compromise
Interest groups would receive union funds to coordinate their
activities. They would send representatives to the local meetings,
where they would debate their disagreements with the union
leadership. Locals throughout the union would be exposed to dif-
ferent perspectives on the broader goals of the union. The debate
would encourage compromise solutions to the early problems and
would furnish the leadership with guidelines for their negotiating
teams. In the long run, the discussions would promote the twin
ideals of leadership accountability and worker participation.
3. Negotiations, Interest Group Closure, and First-Round
Vetoes
After considering what it had learned from the local meet-
141. One reason to refuse to certify is especially important. It would certainly be
appropriate for a union to deny certification to a prospective interest group leader, call
her Mary, on the ground that it had already certified her interest group, albeit under other
leadership. To ensure that union funds were used most efficiently, the union could legiti-
mately insist that Mary join a pre-existing group that shared her long-term economic
interest. If the interest group refused to let Mary join, see text at note 144 infra, she could
then ask the union leadership to decertify that interest group and to certify her as the head
of a new interest group; if the union refused, she could appeal to the NLRB. If Mary joined
the other interest group and then decided that its leaders were incompetent, she could
attempt to replace them through the group's democratic processes.
142. Routinely, the NLRB would not reach a decision on the workers' complaint until
some time after the signing of a new contract. A union that is uncertain about a group's
certification or veto rights could evaluate its options by refusing to recognize the group
and awaiting the Regional Director's disposition of a group member's unfair labor practice
charge. The Director's failure to issue a complaint would end the matter; issuing the
complaint could be read as informal advice that the interest group should be certified or
given its veto rights. If a union continued its refusal even though a complaint issued, the
objecting worker could request that the Director seek a § 10(j) injunction. Section 10(j) of
the L.M.R.A. (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976), reads, in part:
The Board shall have the power upon issuance of a complaint. . . charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any
United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order. Upon the filing of any such petition the *court. . . shall have jurisdiction to
grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper.
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ings, the union leadership would have to negotiate a contract with
management.' It would then present that contract to the mem-
bership for ratification. Before the vote, all members would have
to declare with which, if any, interest groups they would like to
affiliate. "4 During the ratification vote, any certified interest
group could, by a majority vote,' veto the entire contract if it
failed to meet the objections the group had raised in its initial
request for certification. A veto would be a binding rejection of
the entire contract; it would force the union to discuss the prob-
lem with the interest group and to renegotiate in good faith with
management.
4. Subsequent Limited Vetoes
After the union leadership and management reached a sec-
ond accord, it would be submitted to the membership. This time,
interest groups would have only a limited veto. Any group that
had vetoed the first contract proposal and any group whose inter-
ests had been harmed by the changes between the first and sec-
ond proposals could again veto the proposed contract. However,
a two-thirds supermajority in favor of ratification would override
any second veto. "' Such a limited veto power would ensure that
interest groups could promote and protect their goals, while safe-
guarding the union majority from tyranny by the few."7
143. If both union and management consent, the negotiations might involve testi-
mony and suggestions from interest group representatives.
144. The factual determination of whether a particular member shares a group's
defining common economic interest would be made by the interest group leaders, subject
to appeal to the union leadership and ultimately to review by the NLRB. See note 141
supra.
145. Interest groups would make all their decisions by majority vote, even decisions
on whether to replace their own leaders. Absolute majoritarianism is tolerable in an
interest group but not in a union because of the assurances of relative homogeneity found
in the former, Furthermore, participation in an interest group is voluntary; as we have
seen, representation by a union is not.
146. Of course, there is nothing sacred about the 2/3 figure. A 60% requirement, or a
75% requirement might work just as well to protect the many different interests involved.
147. The limited veto rights also act as a barrier to the formation of fringe and
splinter groups. Such groups would have little chance of forestalling contract negotiations
and no chance of mustering the supermajority required to avoid contract ratification.
Certain groups would recognize this fact without waiting for it to be demonstrated. Skilled
workers would understand that they will be more successful together than in competition
with each other. If workers abused the opportunity for interest group formation, it would
be the union's responsibility to control the situation by refusing to utilize the veto pro-
posal, thereby permitting review by the NLRB. See note 142 supra.
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5. NLRB Review of Union Conduct
The union bears responsibility for the fair administration of
the proposal. Any union action inconsistent with the purpose of
the proposal - failure to certify a legitimate interest group, to
bargain with management in a manner reflecting in good faith the
needs of all interest groups, or to recognize a legitimate veto -
could be appealed to the NLRB as a violation of section
8(b) (1) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act. If the NLRB
found a violation, it could order the union to take appropriate
remedial action.148
B. Application of the Veto Proposal
To see how the veto proposal might operate, consider the
following hypothetical. Bargaining unit members under 35, who
constitute 70% of the unit, agitate for a shorter workweek and
express their willingness to suffer reduced pay in exchange for
increased leisure time. Workers over 50, who form 20% of the
bargaining unit, want to maintain existing income levels, in part
because they worry about the costs of educating their children
and in part because they can retire early only if they continue to
build their savings. Workers 36-49, who constitute 10% of the
bargaining unit, are indifferent about the workweek issue. As-
sume further that the workweek proposal is the only union con-
tract issue that provokes a dispute among the bargaining unit
members. Although the union leadership prefers the position of
the younger workers, it wants most to bargain without a strike
and to reach a contract that will be enthusiastically ratified by
the membership.
For the union, the optimal resolution of this conflict would
be a contract term shortening the 40-hour, 5-day workweek by 5
hours but still ensuring a 40-hours-per-week pay base. All workers
would be satisfied with this proposal, but (sad to say) manage-
ment would not accept it without serious concessions from the
workers. Therefore, the leadership concludes that its fallback, or
realistic, position should be a 36-hour workweek (4 days of 9 hours
each) with a pay base of 36 hours per week. This stance §atisfies
most workers, but older workers object because the 4-day, 36-hour
week would reduce their earnings.
Without a veto system, the union could simply ignore its
148. See text at notes 171-72 infra.
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older members, with no obligation to seek a compromise. Ratifi-
cation would quickly follow management agreement since the
dissenting voters constitute only one-fifth of the membership.
The majoritarian rules of union elections are often insensitive to
intensities of preferences, and thus the minority status of the
senior workers would also preclude political reprisal against the
leadership."' Moreover, these workers would find no greater sol-
ace through legal or administrative channels: A duty-of-fair-
representation suit would fail since there is no hostile, discrimina-
tory, or arbitrary element in the union's decision."5
Under the veto proposal, however, older workers have a
voice. They assert their interest before the union negotiates with
management, rejecting the shorter-workweek proposal and de-
manding discussion of compromise alternatives. During prenego-
tiation local meetings, where leadership-sponsored contract pro-
posals are presented and membership concerns aired, older work-
ers discuss"' their problems with coworkers and union officials.
During the local meetings, individual senior workers clarify their
common interests and band together. They contact similarly situ-
ated members of other locals and build an informal network of
potential pressure groups. Finally, once it is clear that they need
formal recognition to press their claim, they apply to the union
leadership to be certified as an interest group.
After the union grants certification, the older workers' inter-
est group seeks membership lists and applies for union funds to
assist its campaign. The union leadership is obligated to send the
general membership a copy of all disputed workweek proposals
and to finance mailing the interest group's counter-proposals."I
149. Only in the case of a union marked by many dissatisfied interest groups would
nonratification or use of political influence be possible. But in a union so divided, the
leadership would most likely avoid alienating a majority of the workers by sidestepping
sensitive issues in collective bargaining des~nands. Alternatively, the leadership might
cater to a sufficient number of powerful interest groups to create a voting majority that
would support the contract and the leadership.
150. As the court observed in Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018,
1025 (9th Cir. 1972), "it will be the unusual case in which hostile discrimination, bad faith,
dishonesty, or arbitrary conduct can be alleged" (emphasis added).
151. The term "discuss" emphasizes that internal union consultations over pro.
posed bargaining demands should precede informal union-management contract talks as
well as formal bargaining sessions. Discussions held one year before negotiations are
necessary to permit interest group organizing. If general economic conditions change
during the year, it may be necessary for the union leadership to consult more generally
with their constituents.
152. Compare the similar plan used by the ITU to give the opposition political party
access to members, discussed in Li's', supra note 76, at 297-304.
1524 [Vol. 77:1485
Interest Group Participation
In this case, the older workers suggest that the union take one of
two positions: insistence on a 36-hour workweek with a 40-hour
pay base, even at the expense of other worker privileges, or insist-
ence on a 36-hour workweek with a 36-hour pay base and guaran-
teed overtime assignments for all older workers, regardless of sen-
iority.
In response, the younger workers form their own interest
group, intent on defending the position of the union leadership. '
The groups debate at the various local meetings, which work as
a crucible for compromise.' Gradually, new alternatives evolve.
The younger workers decide that they could live with a program
offering guaranteed overtime to senior workers, as long as the
guarantee only creates preferences for time-and-a-half - and
not double-time - pay rates. The interest groups conduct
straw polls of their members to determine which alternatives
are acceptable and which are not. These polls give the union
leadership guidelines for its negotiations with management. In
fact, the negotiators use the guidelines as bargaining tools to
present management with the nonratification risks associated
with each management position. The negotiating parties can
bargain knowing the limits of a ratifiable agreement.
Anything can happen during union-management negotia-
tions, and I will now consider how several different possibilities
would be treated under the proposal. Suppose first that the union
leadership and management agree to a contract including a provi-
153. In addition, the older workers' proposal could generate a third faction of workers
with low seniority who might be displaced due to the high cost of preferential overtime.
Of course, they would be entitled to the same organizational opportunities as the older
workers, and ideally, their interest would be accommodated through compromise. If low-
seniority workers were younger workers as well, the younger workers as a group might
support their colleagues with low seniority.
The proposal generally requires interest groups to negotiate with the union before the
union-management bargaining. However, if management subsequently proposes contract
terms that would disadvantage an identifiable group of workers, the union would have an
obligation to notify its membership and to submit any subsequent agreement on that issue
to affected members. (Affected members would be identified by local officials.) Of necess-
ity, the requirement of union-initiated notification regarding controversial management
proposals would be limited to those situations where the harm to economic groups within
unions was or should have been clear.
154. A union could decide, in consultation with its membership, that the best way
to deal with sustained disagreement over contract terms is to submit the matter to an
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. In order to avoid biased decisions, the arbitrator would
need to be designated as a permanent umpire for intraunion disputes with an established
tenure; and the arbitrator would be required to give up any union-management appoint-
ments as arbitrator for issues arising under the collective bargaining agreement.
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sion identical to the union's original fallback position: a 36-hour
workweek, with a 36-hour pay base and no guaranteed overtime.
In such a situation the older workers' interest group would have
legitimate grounds to veto the agreement because it is directly
opposed to the interests they expressed earlier. Of course, the
older workers may decide not to exercise the veto - a majority
of the interest group may prefer the security and over-all terms
of the negotiated contract. Assuming that the older workers
veto, however, the union leadership must decide whether to rec-
ognize the veto as a legitimate expression of interest group
goals. 55 Under these circumstances, the leadership probably
would; to defy the veto and declare the negotiated contract valid
would certainly invite a successful appeal to the NLRB. After
the veto, the leadership would caucus with the interest groups
once more and return to bargain with management a second
time. If still dissatisfied with the results, the interest group
could impose a supermajority requirement for ratification by
registering its disapproval.'" Should the requisite super-
majority ratify this version, the older workers' only recourse
would be to complain that the union had violated its duty by
not bargaining in good faith.
But things may not go so smoothly. During the first negotia-
tions, management and the union may not agree to anything that
anyone had proposed earlier. They may come up with a contract
including a clause offering a 36-hour workweek with a 36-hour pay
base and guaranteed overtime up to 391/2 hours per week. Such a
proposal would be very close to what the older workers had asked
for, and thus one might expect them to choose not to veto. Yet
perhaps this is a particularly contentious interest group, one that
has been ignored for many years. The group may choose to veto
anyway. In such an instance, the union leadership may reasona-
bly decide that the interest group's behavior is beyond the legiti-
mate scope of their interest and therefore choose not to recognize
the veto. The interest group's appeal to the NLRB would most
155. As is true throughout this proposal, the union administers every stage of the
system. Its judgment is subject to review by the NLRB.
156. One reason that members might vote for ratification in such large numbers,
despite the opposition of coworkers, would be a union assertion that the barrier to a
satisfactory compromise on the workweek issue was the employer's unwillingness to ap-
prove any workweek contract term acceptable to the interest groups. The union's responsi-
bility to a defeated interest group in this situation would be to file an unfair labor practice
claim for refusal to bargain under 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), and to attempt to persuade
the management negotiators to embrace a workweek proposal acceptable to the union as
a whole in the next negotiations.
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likely fail because of the close similarity of the group's expressed
goals and the ratified provisions.
Thus, in my hypothetical, the veto proposal would help the
older workers without allowing them to strangle the union. A
group that is .normally ignored would be given enough power to
force discussion and a search for compromise, but not enough
power to hold the majority hostage. This delicate balance is fairer
than the accommodation reached under the present system.
C. NLRB Review of Union Conduct and Decisions
1. Union Action That Violates Section 8(b)(1)(A)
Under the veto proposal, various types of union conduct
would be vulnerable to attack through section 8(b)(1)(A). First,
union leadership might not hold local meetings to discuss pro-
posed contract terms. Although I sincerely doubt that a union
would ever violate the proposal so blatantly, the possibility
should not be completely discounted. A union bent on defying
section 8(b) (1) (A) or the duty of fair representation would proba-
bly prefer subtler efforts to exclude dissidents from local meetings
or to limit the scope and amount of debate. Nonetheless, the
NLRB should strike down with equal vehemence both the ob-
vious and the devious forms of bad faith.' 57
The union could also violate section 8(b)(1)(A) by refusing
to acknowledge an interest group, to circulate its proposals among
the membership, or to provide funds for it to conduct its cam-
paign. For example, if three workers in a small New Jersey local
complained at a local meeting, declaring their dissatisfaction
with the union's treatment of workers who share their interests,
the president of the local would be obligated to inform them of
their right to seek certification. Should they pursue that right, the
union leadership would need to decide the showing of interest
required to certify an interest group. The spirit of the veto pro-
posal suggests that unions ought to respond to all expressions of
discontent. On the other hand, the interest group certification
process might be exploited by workers wanting to pursue petty
vendettas or to siphon off union funds. That is a serious danger;
I would therefore suggest that the NLRB find a violation of sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) only when there is evidence that the leadership
157. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 232 U.S. 192, 204 (1944), establishes that all
unions must give bargaining unit members the opportunity, to express their views on
collective bargaining issues.
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ignored a group whose interests were held throughout the mem-
bership, or were of compelling national concern.
For example, a union proposal to shorten the workweek
would affect most workers' economic status and could be ex-
pected to inspire argument in each local. Once the locals fulfilled
their duty to inform members of their right to apply for certifica-
tion as an interest group, applications would undoubtedly flood
the national headquarters. In such a situation, no one would
question the significance of the interest. One can imagine other
proposals that might stimulate opposition less widespread, but
just as substantial. A proposal sacrificing benefits for those who
are relocated might only receive criticism in those locals with high
turnover rates; nonetheless, the opposition could be substantial
enough to warrant certification if the dissidents could adequately
define their shared economic interest.
There may even be situations where a union has a duty to
respond although only a few locals report membership agitation.
For example, only scattered locals having a high percentage of
blacks and hispanics would be apt to propose a contract clause
mandating preferential treatment for qualified members of mi-
nority groups. However, the small number of concerned locals
should not relieve the union of responsibility to recognize the
group, circulate the proposal, and support the group financially.
The issue raised is of general social concern and a union would
surely confront it eventually.' 8 That the union did not choose the
timing or forum for discussing the issue should be irrelevant to
its obligation to deal with something so intimately related to both
worker livelihood and public policy. The NLRB could require
unions to follow the veto proposal procedures whenever the lead-
ership knows or should know that a decision is vital to a discrete
group within the union.
A final way for union leaders to violate section 8(b)(1)(A)
would be to negotiate with management in bad faith or in disre-
158. Sensitive or inherently disruptive issues that are not of current concern might
not be sufficiently important to require immediate union discussion. For example, re-
quests by blacks for a contract clause mandating preferential treatment would not require
union response if made in 1930, because the contemporary climate would not alert the
union that the issue was of general concern and was expected to be dealt with in the near
future. Such demands would require union consideration in 1970. To the extent that
guidelines are required for union decisions as to the seriousness or relevancy of interest
group complaints, the Board could decide to require union compliance with the veto
proposal when interest groups raise issues concerning all mandatory subjects of bargaining
and those permissive subjects that are commonly bargained over in the industry.
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gard of the veto procedures. This category of violations would
include failure to negotiate consistently with the interest group
objectives, failure to allow the affected interest groups an oppor-
tunity to veto any union-management proposals that differ signif-
icantly from intraunion comprcmises, refusal to recognize legiti-
mate interest group vetoes, and, perhaps, knowing use of griev-
ance settlements to change the meaning of previously ratified
contract provisions in a way that harms interest groups. In each
of these circumstances the NLRB should consider the reasons for
the union's final decision (such as employer intractability or a
reasonable belief that the rejected interest group proposal was
unlawful), and the fairness of the union's decision in light of
compromise discussions. '59 In essence, the Board would evaluate
the union's bargaining posture. '
If the Board found in favor of the complaining interest group,
it could choose among a variety of remedies commensurate with
the nature and extent of the union violation. The NLRB might
set aside the bargaining agreement or sever any offending provi-
sions. It might also order the parties to bargain again and reach
an agreement consistent with particular guidelines. If the NLRB
required renegotiation of the offending provisions or the entire
contract, it might direct the union and management to permit
representatives of the affected interest groups to be parties to the
negotiation. Even if it stopped short of ordering full participation
in the negotiations, the NLRB might insist on interest group
ratification of any subsequently negotiated contract or clause. Of
course, the NLRB need not void the contract or sever the chal-
lenged provision. If the effect of the union's violation on interest
group members is minor, the Board might order the. union to
compensate any disadvantaged workers but let the bargain stand.
This lesser remedy would be available, standing alone or as a
supplement to stronger sanctions, no matter what form the
Board's order took. Similarly, the Board could hold the union
159. The Board's role would be different from that condemned in H.K. Porter Co.,
Disston Div.-Danville Works v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), in which the Supreme Court
held that the Board could not itself impose a contract term on the parties as a remedy for
violating § 8(d) of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Under the veto proposal, the
Board would be evaluating the union's conduct and the fairness of the union's decision to
the protesting interest group, not the quality of the bargain struck by union and manage-
ment. To the extent that employer intractability or the illegality of the proposed contract
provision constitute defenses, there would be no violation of § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
160. This is similar to the Board's role in duty-of-fair-representation cases.
June 1979] 1529
liable to management for any monetary loss that the union's0
unlawful conduct caused. Whatever option the Board chose, it
would have to ensure that the remedy was adequate to protect
minority interests.
2. Designation of the NLRB to Remedy Violations
For purposes of description I have assumed that the NLRB
will hear the employee challenges to union conduct under the
interest-group-veto proposal. Although the NLRB is not the only
possible reviewing agency, it is probably the most appropriate.
Because my proposal governs conflicts between employee-
workplace expectations and general union interests, it affects
matters traditionally adjudged within the scope of the NLRA, the
Act from which the Board draws its purpose and direction. More-
over, the NLRB has already developed a familiarity with worker-
union conflicts over bargaining and grievance arbitration through
cases alleging violations of the duty of fair representation. The
Ninth Circuit has noted, "As a practical matter, intra-union con-
duct could not be wholly excluded from the duty of fair represen-
tation, for . . . internal union policies and practices may have a
substantial impact upon the external relationships of members of
the unit to their employer.""6 ' This familiarity would be useful in
the early stages of implementing the veto proposal. Although
federal judges are no doubt as able as Board members to evaluate
straightforward claims of frustrated employee expectations, they
lack the Board's intimacy with the union environment in which
contract proposals are spawned."' In addition, litigating a chal-
lenge to union conduct before the Board may save time and
money.
The NLRB has asserted jurisdiction over claims alleging
union interference with members' statutory or contractual rights
even where there was no allegation that the union violated its
duty of fair representation. In Glass Bottle Blowers Association
(Owen-Illinois, Inc.)"3 the Board found an independent violation
of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Sixth Cir-
161. Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 1972).
162. There are two methods for attacking alleged violations of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. See note 35 supra.
163. 210 N.L.R.B. 943 (1974), enforced, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975). See also IAM
Local 697 (Canfield Rubber), 223 N.L.R.B. 832 (1976) (ordering local to handle grievances
of any bargaining unit member, without regard to union membership).
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cuit enforced its order. 6' The Board determined that the union
had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining sex-segregated
locals, each processing its own grievances although they operated
under identical contracts. Since resolution of a grievance brought
by either local would be binding on both, the first local to prose-
cute controlled the fate of any disputed contract interpretation
issue. As Member Kennedy stated, "Denial of a voice to those
who may be affected by the settlement of a grievance is an inter-
ference with Section 7 rights."165
The only plausible alternative to Board review of employee
challenges under the veto proposal is arbitration. Arbitrators
have surely developed a great sensitivity to issues of contract
interpretation and industrial practice. However, two objections to
the use of arbitrators appear decisive. First, disputes would in-
volve not only concerns with grievance-arbitration procedures,
but also statutory rights under section 7 of the Taft-Hartley
Act. '6 Despite a preference for arbitral resolution of labor dis-
putes, even the NLRB has recognized that it would be inappro-
priate to defer to arbitration when violations of section 7 rights
are alleged. 67 More importantly, arbitrators, because they spe-
cialize in applying individual contractual provisions to single
events, are relatively unconcerned with establishing uniformity
among decisions interpreting different contracts. But uniform
standards of union conduct are essential to the operation of the
veto proposal: the proposal must protect all minority causes
equally, even unpopular ones. Thus, the Board is the proper
agency to provide consistency and to develop guidelines by which
unions may judge their own conduct.
3. Authority of the NLRB to Find and Remedy Violations
There are three ways to establish the veto proposal and per-
mit the Board to review union conduct. Congress could add a new
unfair labor practice provision to the NLRA. Such a provision
might read as follows:
164. NLRB v. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975).
165. 210 N.L.R\B. at 946. (Member Kennedy concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Sixth Circuit upheld the Board's order requiring the merger of the two locals,
despite the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) which permits unions to establish their own member-
ship criteria. 520 F.2d at 697.
166. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
167. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
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8(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents
(8) not to recognize and attempt to accommodate the di-
verging economic interests within any bargaining unit,
provided that said interests are made known to the
labor organization in a timely manner and with a suffi-
cient showing of interest, as provided for by the deci-
sions of or regulations promulgated by the National
Labor Relations Board.
Second, the NLRB might incorporate the veto through its
decisions, finding that a union violated section 8(b) (1) (A) by not
dealing fairly with the protests of an interest group. ' The Board
could describe the procedures expected of labor unions in such a
decision.
Finally, the NLRB could promulgate rules and regulations,
as provided for in section 6 of the Taft-Hartley Act, '" articulating
the position of interest groups and the responsibilities of unions.'7"
Failure to meet these regulations would constitute a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(A). For my purposes, this last approach is the
most satisfactory. It would not require the legislative action that
the first option entails, and unlike the second option, it would
provide adequate notice of the Board's intentions and allow pub-
lic comment before taking effect.
Whichever of the three methods of implementing the interest
group veto proposal the Board selects, it already has the power
to enforce the proposal pursuant to its authority to remedy any
unfair labor practice violation under section 10(c) of Taft-
Hartley:
[The Board may] issue and cause to be served . . . an order
requiring [the violator] to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this [Act].'
168. The NLRB routinely announces new rules of decision when adjudicating cases.
See, e.g., Shopping Kart Food Mkts. Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190 (1977). Of course, the
Board may also recant and revive the prior rule of decision as it did when it overruled
Shopping Kart in General Knit, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1978).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
170. The NLRB has rarely used the rulemaking approach to regulating conduct under
the NLRA. For a general discussion of the issue involved, see Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE
L.J. 571 (1970).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
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Courts have broadly construed that authority to issue affirmative
orders, not limiting it to the specific remedy of reinstatement.' 2
They could certainly construe it to permit the sanctions necessary
to effectuate the veto proposal.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHY FOLLOW THE VETO PATH?
The traditional internal union structure of unbridled major-
ity rule evolved at a time when survival of the labor movement
was conjectural. There is no longer any question, however, about
the ability of modern labor organizations to organize workers,
negotiate with management, and effectively administer collective
bargaining agreements.13 Thus, the need to concentrate power in
a few leaders and limit rank-and-file debate over policy has
abated. With the issue no longer union survival but the quality
of union representation,' 74 the focus of contemporary debate
should be on alternative means of structuring the relationship
between the union leadership and union members.
In this Article I have proposed a new plan, one that speaks
directly to the workers' need for better control over the terms of
their employment contracts. Its centerpiece, the interest group
veto, has already received a limited test from one major union,
the United Auto Workers. "5 Since 1957, the UAW has attempted
to quell the dissatisfaction of skilled workers by increasing their
control over the contract ratification process. The UAW constitu-
172. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941) ("Making the work-
ers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication
of the public policy which the Board enforces."); Wicker v. Hoppok, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94,
99 (1867), quoted with approval in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19
(1975) ("The general rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives a remedy,
the compensation shall be equal to the injury. The latter is the standard by which the
former is to be measured. The injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the
situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.").
173. The Supreme Court noted this change in the emphasis of labor law in Boy's
Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970), where it observed that there
has been a shift "from protection of the nascent labor movement to the encouragement
of collective bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of
industrial disputes."
174. The Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has identified
different workplace changes to which unions have failed to respond: "the thrust of minori-
ties with many demands for jobs, for improvement of jobs, for acceptance into the system
.. . new attitudes, new mores, a change in the value system of younger people coming
into the workforce." Horvitz, supra note 119, at 453, 454.
175. In addition, some workers have formed caucuses within their unions to pressure
union leadership into recognizing the interests of caucus members. Unlike the proposed
economic interest groups, however, these caucuses have no right or power to reject union
decisions and the membership may be constant over time, regardless of the particular
issues on which the caucuses are working.
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tion was amended in that year to permit skilled trades and pro-
duction workers to vote separately on contract "matters that are
common to all members."'76 In 1966, the skilled workers were able
to pressure the UAW into amending the constitution further, to
provide that production and skilled-trades workers "would vote
separately on contractual matters common to all and, in the
same vote, on matters which relate exclusively to their group."'"
As then-Vice President Leonard Woodcock explained the amend-
ment:
What happens when one group rejects and the other accepts? Well,
it is pretty obvious what happens if production rejects, because the
majority is an automatic rejection, isn't it? But .... what hap-
pens when production accepts and skilled trades rejects?
[W]e want to say here and now that separate ratification is
an empty process, and it cannot trigger necessary action to solve
problems that have led to rejection if it does not lead to pressure
on the companies.
So we want to say very clearly, if either group rejects, then
there is no agreement ....
The UAW decision to give skilled trades workers veto power
over the entire bargaining agreement was not altruistic. The In-
ternational Society of Skilled Trades (ISST) was agitating to pull
the skilled trades workers out of the primarily industrial UAW on
the ground that it did not adequately promote the specialized
interests of the skilled workers.17' The UAW needed the leverage
176. UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) PROCEEDINGS, SIXTEENTH CON-
sTIrUTIONAL CONVENTION 275 (1957). The debate on the proposal is at 278-88. In addition
to granting separate ratification rights to production and skilled workers, the amendment
extended these rights to office workers, engineers, and technicians, on application to and
approval of the International Executive Board.
177. UNITED AuToMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) PROCEEDINGS, TWENTIETH CON-
sTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 405 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 20TH CONV.]. The debate on the
proposal is at 405-13. The UAW also extended special ratification rights to office workers,
engineers, and technicians. See note 176 supra.
178. Id. at 407. When tested in 1973, the UAW public review board rendered the
separate ratification rights provision useless. See Poszich v. UAW Local 316 (Pub. Rev.
Bd., Intl. Union UAW, April 10, 1974), [BNA] Daily Labor Reporter, No. 75, at E-10,
April 17, 1974. For a description and ea'rly analysis of the public review board, see J.
STEIBER, W.E. OBEROR, & M. HARRINGTON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIc REVIEWS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE UAW PUBLIC REVIEW BOARD (1960). More recent evaluations appear in Brooks,
Stability Versus Employee Free Choice, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 359-61 (1976); THE DuTY
OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 36, at 99-103.
179. Sde Brooks, supra note 178, at 357-61, for a description of the relationship be-
tween ISST organizing efforts, NLRB rules on disaffiliation and separate bargaining
units for skilled workers, and the UAW decision to grant greater internal power to the
skilled-trades members. See also Raskin, Labor: Mass-Production Unions Facing Schism
in their R3anks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1976, at 47, col. 1.
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provided by the skilled workers when bargaining for the more
easily replaced production workers, and the leadership believed
that the union's future depended on adapting to automation and
converting production workers into skilled tradespeople. Thus,
the UAW's grant of special veto rights to an interest group was
one union's response to a powerful minority whose value out-
weighed the majority's interest in retaining unlimited control.'8 "
Obviously, most economic interest groups lack the leverage of the
skilled workers in the UAW. But the UAW example demonstrates
that a large, international union believes that it can function
effectively in the face of a potential veto by an interest group."'
The general veto proposal goes beyond the narrow UAW sys-
tem and further improves the quality of representation. Its princi-
pal advantage is that its procedures encourage rank-and-file par-
ticipation in union activities. Regardless of whether they use the
veto successfully, workers who share economic interests and who
join together to further those interests may regain some control
over their economic lives by influencing union decisions or even
by seeking positions of authority within their unions.8 2 Further-
The UAW constitution also provides that "contract or supplement demands affecting
skilled workers. . . . shall be submitted to the Skilled Trades Department [before being
submitted to management] in order to effectuate an industry-wide standardization of
agreements on wages, hours, apprenticeship programs, journeymen standards and working
conditions." 20TH CoNv., supra note 176, at 405.
180. Other unions have responded to worker dissatisfaction in less radical ways. One
interesting approach, which incorporates some procedural aspects of the veto proposal, is
that of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW) union, which represents about
60,000 workers who are under 400 contracts. The OCAW has a policy of prenegotiation
meetings which maximizes worker participation in formulating union bargaining goals.
Bargaining demands are promulgated by a national bargaining policy committee, com-
posed of eight rank-and-file workers and four administration officers, after a conference
at which rank-and-file workers meet to suggest bargaining policy. The bargaining de-
mands established by the national bargaining council are then submitted for ratification
to every bargaining unit in the country. See 98 L.R.R.M. 131 (1978).
181. Furthermore, the auto companies' acceptance of the UAW decision to condition
final ratification of any bargaining agreement on approval by the skilled-trades workers
suggests that private sector management is able to live with conditional agreements and
to deal with the pressures inherent in separate ratification.
182. Although participation in union political life may be a beneficial by-product of
the veto procedures, the proposal is not designed as a means for developing an established
political party which opposes the incumbent leadership. Under the veto proposal the
likelihood that formation of an economic interest group will lead to political aspirations
on the part of interest group members is great; but the opportunity to challenge the
leadership of the union is remote, since a single-issue interest group would not create a
stable, loyal, and hardworking constituency. At most, the leaders of interest groups would
develop the abilities required to become part of the existing political process within the
unions.
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more, increased member participation strengthens unions and
improves the public image of these vital economic institutions.'
The veto proposal also enhances union responsiveness to
member needs because it requires interest groups to identify their
concerns and formulate concrete alternatives to leadership pro-
posals. And since the employees themselves must designate
which union decisions are significant, increased participation
helps the NLRB, union leadership, and management. The Board,
drawing on an interest group's initial statement of goals and the
positions it takes during subsequent negotiations, is better able
to evaluate the reasonableness of an employee's challenge. With-
out these employee-initiated guidelines, the Board must specu-
late about an item's significance to protesting employees and
about the fairness of the union's decision in light of alternatives
that the union may or may not have been aware of during con-
tract negotiations or grievance procedures. Additionally, because
interest groups must identify themselves (and their leaders) sea-
sonably, the proposal limits the nature and frequency of Board
findings that invalidate union-employer decisions. Most will be
disposed of on simple procedural grounds.
From the union's perspective, the veto plan directs attention
toward issues which workers feel are important through early
group self-identification and the requirement that interest groups
formulate proposals to deal with their concerns. This information
should aid the leadership in revising and improving its own con-
tract proposals. Management, too, may benefit. Informed by the
union leadership about interest group formation and demands,
management can foresee challenges to the negotiated contract
and, to some extent, avoid them through anticipatory bargaining.
The proposal spares the outside observer the onerous task of de-
riving the hierarchy of workers' values. Moreover, since the veto
proposal places pressure on leadership to accommodate interest
group demands, it may lessen the likelihood of wildcat strikes."4
The proposal thus contributes in many ways to stability in collec-
tive bargaining.
Finally, by requiring unions to permit all interested members
183. As pointed out previously, membership participation in union meetings is
greater when critical decisions about union policies are under consideration than when
routine business matters are on the agenda. Therefore, the generally low participation
rates are irrelevant to this discussion and do not undercut the point being made. See note
89 supra.
184. See notes 117:2 supra and accompanying text.
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to participate in union decisions, the veto proposal strengthens
the law's protection of the legitimate interests of each member.
Through this process, each union and concerned interest group
should reach a decision that will more evenly distribute economic
benefits to all bargaining unit members, unlike the present sys-
tem, which assigns contractual benefits by the vote of a bare
majority of workers. At the same -time, the .proposal blocks at-
tempts by a powerful minority group, such as the skilled workers
in an industrial union, to insist on the lion's share of wage in-
creases for themselves, since it retains a modified principle of
majority rule. In such a circumstance, discussions between skilled
and industrial workers could lead to mutual understanding of
each other's concerns, to compromise, and to accommodation.
Congress has bestowed upon unions the authority to speak
for the workers they represent and to make decisions affecting the
economic lives of those workers. The need for a strong voice on
behalf of a union's constituency is clear, but the need for a single
voice is less clear. Unionized workers, even those holding unusual
views, deserve some control over the decisions that their unions
make in determining bargaining goals. This Article proposes that
unions adopt a process through which workers may take an active
role in formulating union priorities and by which all unionized
workers could assert their interests in contract issues of particular
significance to their economic well-being.
The veto proposal, for all its laudable objectives, is not with-
out its costs. It may involve more time and money than simpler
ideas. It may increase the workload of the NLRB. 15  But the pro-
posal offers a prototypical framework for giving individual work-
ers a stronger voice in their own unions. Its concern with interest
group formation and with union leadership accountability are
intended to stimulate further inquiry and discussion about the
relationship between a union and the economic needs of its mem-
bers.
The struggle to achieve recognition infused the labor move-
ment with dedication and idealism. That fervor abated as unions
secured parity with management at the bargaining table. The
labor movement's next task is to ensure that all union members
185. A proliferation of interest groups can be anticipated following adoption of the
veto proposal and there is no way to know the effect of this development on the functioning
of labor unions. I suspect, however, that the ease with which interest groups can be
formed, see text at notes 140-42 supra, is adequately counterbalanced by the requirements
for a successful veto, see notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text.
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have genuine control over how the fruits of that parity are distrib-
uted. As Joel Seidman has observed: "One of the tests of union
democracy is whether members are free to express opposition to
the leaders and their policies without fear of reprisal. Even more
important, it seems to me, is whether they possess the right to
organize to make their opposition effective."'' 6 The veto proposal,
by guaranteeing effective and loyal opposition, may provide the
necessary spark to recapture labor's lost enthusiasm.
186. J. SEIrMAN, supra note 14, at 37.
